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MERE THIEVES
ROBERT STEINBUCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, criminals are capable of stealing financial secrets from
multinational corporations.1  These hackers can adversely affect stock
markets by trading on stolen confidential information.  Securities ju-
risprudence, however, has focused largely on the activities of insiders
who secretly trade on information that they legally gain through their
positions of trust—i.e., insider trading—and has not addressed the
culpability of “mere thieves”2 who trade on confidential financial in-
formation gained through illegal means.3  As such, a void in securities
law exists regarding how to address the theft and use of confidential
financial information by strangers under the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-5.4
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1. See, e.g., Litigation Release No. 19,450, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
SEC Files Emergency Action Against Estonian Traders to Stop Ongoing Fraudulent Hack-
ing Scheme (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19450.htm; see also
SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05-CV-9259 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (final judg-
ment against hackers).
2. David C. Bayne, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory Ignored: Ginsburg’s
O’Hagan, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 64 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239–40 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (arguing that insider trading rules should apply to “any person engaged in any
fraudulent scheme,” not just parties with some fiduciary relationship); see also Bayne, supra
note 2, at 64 (distinguishing “[m]ere” thieves from “[t]rusted” thieves); Donna M. Nagy, Re- R
framing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1255 (1998) (deeming it “doubtful” that a hacker’s or thief’s securities
trades would violate Rule 10b-5); Rebecca S. Smith, Comment, O’Hagan Revisited: Should a
Fiduciary Duty Be Required Under the Misappropriation Theory?, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1014
(2006) (describing the criticisms of O’Hagan’s fiduciary duty requirement, stating that the
use of nonpublic information, not the manner in which it is acquired, is “at the heart” of
the harm).
4. A stranger’s theft of confidential financial information may be a consequence of
computer hacking or of more traditional misconduct such as burglary or robbery.  But
even if the theft is a consequence of computer hacking, many commentators believe that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 probably do not cover misconduct by a “‘mere’ thief.” See,
e.g., Nagy, supra note 3, at 1255.  This is despite the SEC’s creation of an Internet enforce- R
ment division that investigates and prosecutes Internet securities-related fraud. See In-
ternet Enforcement Program, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/internetenforce.htm
570
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Recently, the SEC faced this issue in three cases where the de-
fendants allegedly hacked into a financial institution’s network and
traded on the uncovered confidential information.5  In the ensuing
enforcement actions against the hackers, the SEC asserted that such
behavior—mere thieves6 trading on stolen confidential material—vio-
lates the SEC’s well-known insider trading rule: 10b-5.7  This Article
engages the line of inquiry of whether Rule 10b-5 creates liability for
securities trading by mere thieves.8
This Article will discuss the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(the Act), emphasizing the most prominent regulation promulgated
by the SEC: Rule 10b-5 (the Rule).9  Next, the Article will discuss the
general fraud and insider trading bases for liability under Rule 10b-
5.10  This section will consider the two fundamental theories of insider
trading liability: the classical theory,11 and the misappropriation the-
ory.12  The Article will next analyze how mere thieves are liable under
Rule 10b-5.13  This section will particularly focus on recent SEC regu-
lations extending liability under the misappropriation theory beyond
the fiduciary sphere and the related case law.  Finally, the Article will
(last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (describing the SEC Office of Internet Enforcement and its
mandates).
5. See generally Complaint, SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05-CV-9259
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) [hereinafter Complaint]; Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Com-
mission’s  Response to Defendant Oliver Peek’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to
Vacate Order of Preliminary Injunction, Freeze of Assets and Other Relief, SEC v. Lohmus
Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05-CV-9259 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Re-
sponse]; SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., No. 07-CV-1380(CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007), SEC v.
Dorozhko, 2008 WL 126612 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 08, 2008).
6. The SEC did not employ this term in litigating SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann.
See generally Complaint, supra note 5. R
7. Complaint, supra note 5, at 10–12; see also Plaintiff’s Response, supra note 5, at 9–19 R
(arguing that trading by mere thieves violates Rule 10b-5).  As this Article discusses below,
insider trading jurisprudence is virtually all court created because Rule 10b-5 never men-
tions insider trading. See infra Part II.B.
8. This Article focuses primarily on Department of Justice and SEC enforcement ac-
tions.  The analysis of this Article also applies to private causes of action, although those
cases require plaintiffs to prove slightly different elements. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975) (holding that private causes of action under Rule
10b-5 can be extended only to plaintiffs who are purchasers or sellers of securities, and
who can therefore more easily establish that they were harmed by the use of information
obtained in violation of Rule 10b-5).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.A–B.  The latter source of liability is particularly important because
it offers greatly enhanced penalties against defendants.
11. See infra Part II.B.1.
12. See infra Part II.B.2.
13. See infra Part III.
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discuss regulatory and legislative options for resolving some of the
confusion over the scope of Rule 10b-5.14
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND SEC RULE
10b-5
The basic goals of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193415 are
fairness and efficiency in securities transactions.16 Section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange—
. . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, . . . any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.17
This section is considered to be a “catchall” provision aimed at fraud
in securities trading.18
Pursuant to its authority under the Act, the SEC promulgated
Rule 10b-5,19 which is considered the primary SEC mechanism for reg-
ulating securities fraud, including insider trading.20  The Rule states:
14. See infra Parts IV–V.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78u (2000).
16. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998).  The authors stated that the purpose of the Act is to:
provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities, to assure that
dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among
investors, to ensure that securities can be purchased and sold at economically
efficient transaction costs, and to provide, to the maximum degree practicable,
markets that are open and orderly.
Id. at 175 n.97. See generally ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH
OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD (1993) (providing a comprehensive history of insider trading
law); WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 2 (2d ed. 2006) (provid-
ing an in-depth discussion of insider trading).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
18. J. Dormer Stephen III, United States v. O’Hagan: The Misappropriation Theory Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—Can the Judicial Oak Grow Any Higher?, 102 DICK. L. REV. 277,
283 (1998).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
20. See United States v. Lang, 766 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Md. 1991) (affirming the SEC’s
authority to prosecute corporate insiders under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on the
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.21
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “not intended as a specification
of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are
designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue
advantage may be taken of investors and others.”22  These broad re-
medial provisions are designed to address misleading or deceptive
practices, regardless of whether they technically satisfy the common
law (or statutory) requirements for fraud or deceit.23  Judge Friendly
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ex-
plained that the Act and Rule collectively protect investors by ensur-
ing that purchasers of securities get what they expect and that sellers
are not tricked into parting with their securities for a price the pur-
chaser knows is inadequate.24
Courts recognize two general types of actionable fraud under the
Rule and the Act.  The first is the equivalent of common-law fraud
liability, i.e., simple fraud, which prohibits misrepresentations.25  The
second is insider trading liability, which prohibits individuals from en-
gaging in securities transactions with the benefit of certain informa-
tion that they uniquely possess.26  Rule 10b-5 makes no explicit
mention of insider trading; the prohibition is purely judicial.27
ground that Congress failed “to legislatively amend th[e] longstanding judicial acceptance
of the use of Rule 10b-5” to prosecute insider trading).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
22. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
23. Id. at 910.
24. Chem. Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984).
25. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 (1971)
(citing A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967)) (stating that all fraudu-
lent schemes are prohibited by the Rule and the Act and not just those related to the
purchase or sale of securities).
26. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
27. See id. (describing the judicial reasoning behind the insider trading prohibition);
SZOCKYJ, supra note 16, at 3 (“Neither the law nor the rule explicating it overtly prohibit R
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A. Simple Fraud
The Supreme Court has held that “Rule 10b-5 prohibit[s] all
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception.”28  Courts apply Rule
10b-5 to securities cases involving simple fraud.29  Accordingly, those
generally under no duty to disclose nonpublic information affecting
the market price of securities on which they trade (i.e., outsiders)
have been subject to Rule 10b-5 liability upon making affirmative mis-
representations related to such securities.30
For example, in the class action Liebhard v. Square D Co., defen-
dant Square D Company misrepresented the status of its takeover ne-
gotiations and, in doing so, detrimentally affected the interests of
plaintiffs, some of whom traded options on the company’s securities.31
The Defendant corporation did not owe a fiduciary duty to these op-
tions traders, and had no duty to disclose to them takeover negotia-
tions involving the company.32  Nonetheless, the court denied the
corporation’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Rule 10b-5 imposes
liability even absent a fiduciary relationship between a defendant and
a victim of that defendant’s affirmative misrepresentation.33  In other
words, simple fraud violates Rule 10b-5.
insider trading.”); see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (explaining how insider trading violates
Rule 10b-5 through the application of the judicially created “classical” or “misappropria-
tion” theories).
28. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10 n.7 (citing A.T. Brod & Co., 375 F.2d at 397).
29. See, e.g., id. at 10 (applying Rule 10b-5 to a fraudulent sale of securities that left a
seller without compensation for the sale of its valuable securities).
30. See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (con-
cluding that nothing in the law of the Supreme Court “can be construed to require . . . a
fiduciary relationship between a section 10(b) defendant and the victim of that defen-
dant’s affirmative misrepresentation”); Fry v. UAL Corp., 895 F. Supp. 1018, 1032 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (discussing that Rule 10b-5 liability may attach despite a lack of fiduciary relation-
ship in affirmative misrepresentation cases); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig.,
725 F. Supp. 712, 743–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that options purchased in reliance on
affirmative misstatements may form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 violation); Monetary Mgmt.
Group v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1217, 1222–23 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding
that a broker who misrepresented the marginability of securities to a purchaser materially
deceived the investor); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (assert-
ing that there should not be a separate standard of materiality for securities fraud resulting
from affirmative misrepresentations).
31. 811 F. Supp. 354, 354–55 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
32. Id. at 356.
33. Id. at 356–57; see also In re Digital Equip. Corp. Sec. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.
Mass. 1984) (ruling that Rule 10b-5 allows an optionholder “to sue for affirmative misrep-
resentations”); Lloyd v. Indus. Bio-Test Lab., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 807, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding that a purchaser of calls has standing under Rule 10b-5 to sue for harm caused by
affirmative misrepresentations).
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B. Insider Trading
While affirmative misrepresentations are actionable under Rule
10b-5 as simple fraud, courts have held that the Rule also prohibits
insider trading.34  Under Rule 10b-5, individuals may not purchase or
sell securities based on knowledge of nonpublic information that they
legally obtained or possessed as a consequence of their employment or
similar circumstances.35
34. See SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that
Rule 10b-5 is violated by use of a fraudulent device, with scienter, in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities); Plaintiff’s Response, supra note 5, at 13–14 (arguing that the R
Rule prohibits insider trading).
35. E.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–30 (1980); see also SEC v. Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 851–52 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc) (discussing liability based upon unequal access to knowledge).  While
informational disparities may be inevitable in the securities industry, liability arises to pro-
tect investors who would be less likely to put their money at risk if “trading based on misap-
propriated nonpublic information [wa]s unchecked by law,” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658, and
to protect corporations that would incur increased risk of loss on their investments if infor-
mation was prematurely disclosed, United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 577 (2d Cir.
1991) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992).
The SEC proposed, and the courts over some time established, liability under 10b-5
for people who trade on material nonpublic information acquired through holding a posi-
tion of trust, that is, insider trading. E.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53; Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 226–30.  Courts recognize and protect the inside information as a property interest. See
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–26 (1987) (“Both courts below expressly re-
ferred to the [Wall Street] Journal’s interest in the confidentiality of the contents and
timing of the ‘Heard’ column as a property right, and we agree with that conclusion.  Con-
fidential business information has long been recognized as property.”) (citation omitted).
But cf. Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions
Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information Is Untenable, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 149, 168–73 (1994) [hereinafter Karmel, Why a Property Rights Theory of
Inside Information is Untenable] (arguing that the property rights theory should not apply to
inside information).
The 1985 Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading expanded on the concept of
fairness underlying the application of Rule 10b-5 to insider trading in its report:
[C]ommonsense observations suggest that two of the traditional bases for
prohibitions against insider trading are still sound: the “fair play” and “integrity of
the markets” arguments.  The first relies on the basic policy that cheating is
wrong and on the traditional sympathy for the victim of the cheat.  The second
rests on the oft-repeated argument that people will not entrust their resources to
a marketplace they don’t believe is fair, any more than a card player will put his
chips on the table in a poker game that may be fixed.
SZOCKYJ, supra note 16, at 2.  While the trading of a single corporate insider may not seem R
like a very threatening prospect, it has the potential to be magnified as others piggyback
off the insider’s repeated successful trading. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 577–78 (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Eventually, some may begin to guess the reason
behind the trading, the corporate secret, increasing the risk that the confidential informa-
tion will be widely disclosed, and the true owner of the information will lose its investment
entirely. Id.  The existence of this “word of mouth” circulation of material, nonpublic
information is demonstrated in stories put out by the media.  Theodore C. McCullough,
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Neither the Act nor the Rule expressly addresses insider trading.
Rather, the Rule prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.36  The issue in establishing insider trading liability
under 10b-5, therefore, was whether regulators and courts could char-
acterize insider trading as fraud or deceit.37  The courts, with the
SEC’s endorsement, addressed this concern by equating a breach of
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty with the fraud requirement of 10b-5.38
Thus, if an insider intends to trade securities based on confidential
information gained through a fiduciary relationship with the informa-
tion’s owner, the insider commits fraud by failing to disclose his trad-
ing intentions to the information’s owner prior to the trade.39  Using
this linguistic legerdemain of equating the failure to disclose trading in-
tentions with fraud,40 the courts created insider trading liability under
Rule 10b-5 and proceeded to expand the Rule’s scope.41
Note, United States v. O’Hagan: Defining the Limits of Fraud and Deceptive Pretext Under Rule
10b-5, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 311, 327 (1998).  Additionally, this type of dissemination is
even more frustrating for corporations and investors because few who participate in this
type of activity are caught. Id. at 328–29.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); see Makor Issues and Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, 437 F.3d
588, 595 (7th Cir. 2006) (articulating the rule that a plaintiff can obtain damages under
Rule 10b-5 if he or she is able to prove that: “(1) the defendant made a false statement or
omission (2) of material fact (3) with scienter (4) in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities (5) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied and (6) that the false statement
proximately caused the plaintiff damages”).
37. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911–12 (1961) (discussing the basis for
finding liability for insider trading within the confines of Rule 10b-5).
38. See, e.g., SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing the theories of
insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 16, § 5:1 (same). R
39. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 6.
40. Cf. Transcript, Roundtable on Insider Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory after O’Hagan,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 7, 27 (1998) [hereinafter Roundtable on Insider Trading] (Ralph K.
Winter, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) (stating that a
breach of fiduciary duty “has nothing to do with fraud or any traditional concept of
fraud”).
41. Commentators disagree on whether insider trading laws positively or negatively af-
fect the efficiency of the market. For in-depth discussions on the economic efficiency of
permitting or restricting the use of market information, see John F. Barry III, The Economics
of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PENN. L. REV. 1307, 1315–19 (1981), and
Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 110–11 (1998) [hereinafter Karmel, Outsider Trading].  While some
argue that permitting insider trading increases efficiency because it allows the market to
more quickly reflect relevant information, others assert that it is inefficient because it sub-
jects the market to manipulation and discourages research and analysis while encouraging
theft. Compare Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 354–55 (1988) (criticizing traditional economic reasons for imposing liability on
insider trading), with Nagy, supra note 3, at 1294 (arguing that insider trading creates inef- R
ficiencies in the market).  One commentator has focused specifically on the efficiency
problems caused by insider trading:
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The courts have developed two general theories to guide the ap-
plication of their judicially created insider trading jurisprudence,42 as
A privilege to exploit information improperly obtained would reduce the incen-
tive to invest in legitimate information production by exacerbating free rider
problems and by placing on producers the risk of misappropriation.  Less infor-
mation would be produced, because at least some producers would shift re-
sources from additional production to theft of what others had produced.
Barry, supra, at 1364.  Indeed, even if one admits that permitting insider trading promotes
efficient allocation of information, any of the presumed benefits are negligible compared
to the harm it has the potential to cause. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 629–32 (1984) (stating that because
derivatively informed trading is slow to permeate the market and does not always occur, it
does not have a significant impact on efficiency).  In contrast, the idea that insider trading
makes the market more efficient is typically grounded on the efficient market hypothesis,
which relies on increasing the distribution of information (whether public or not) to the
market.  Cox & Fogarty, supra, at 355; Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra, at 110 n.160.  Com-
mentators have written extensively on the efficient market hypothesis (in all of its varia-
tions).  For an in-depth discussion of the efficient market hypothesis, see Barry, supra, at
1330–59.  Incidentally, the property rights theory discussed above appeals more to those
who focus on principles of efficiency in relation to securities regulation rather than those
who focus on fairness.  Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra, at 112.  There is also a middle
ground that would apply the rules of intellectual property to inside information. See
Karmel, Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information is Untenable, supra note 35, at R
150–51 (citing BERNHARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING—A LE-
GAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY IN THE USA AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 106,
118–19 (1991); JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY
45–47 (1991)).
42. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).  At first glance, the history of
Rule 10b-5 seems haphazard, and with good reason: the decision to create the Rule was as
much a product of the times as the development of its application has been.  Milton Free-
man told the story of the birth of the Rule as follows:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe.  I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C.
building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division.  He said, “I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen,” who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in
Boston, “and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston who
is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at
$4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a
share for this coming year.  Is there anything we can do about it?”  So he came
upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at
Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there was
where “in connection with the purchase or sale” should be, and we decided it
should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don’t remem-
ber whether we got there that morning or after lunch.  We passed a piece of
paper around to all the commissioners.  All the commissioners read the rule and
they tossed it on the table, indicating approval.  Nobody said anything except
Summer Pike who said, “Well,” he said, “we are against fraud, aren’t we?”  That is
how it happened.
Stephen, supra note 18, at 284 n.32 (quoting Milton Freeman, Remarks Before the Conference R
on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)).
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well as the public’s perception of it:43 the classical theory and the mis-
appropriation theory.44  Each of these theories of liability is analyzed
in seriatim.
1. The Classical Theory
Under the classical theory of insider trading liability, a person
violates Rule 10b-5 by trading on material, nonpublic information be-
cause the trade breaches a duty (nominally) owed to the person with
whom the insider trades, i.e., the former or future shareholder of the
corporation whose stock is the subject of the trade.45  That duty is
founded on an employment or other fiduciary relationship that the
insider has with the shareholders of the company whose stock is
traded.46  This theory was first formally recognized by the majority
opinion in Chiarella v. United States.47
While the explicit language of the classical theory rests on an al-
leged fiduciary relationship between employees, or the like, of a cor-
poration and its shareholders, this description (like much in insider
trading jurisprudence) is imprecise.  Employees and similarly situated
43. See Bhavik R. Patel, Rule 10b-5 No Longer Scares the Judiciary, but May Scare Corporate
Defendants: The United States Supreme Court Switches Directions, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
191, 200 (2002) (noting that the broad language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could
misinform public opinion and lead to frivolous litigation).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (acknowledg-
ing the two recognized Rule 10b-5 fraud theories).  The Supreme Court in United States v.
O’Hagan distinguished the two theories as follows:
Under [the misappropriation] theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of
a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that in-
formation.  In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between com-
pany insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s decep-
tion of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on
nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities.  The classical
theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the
insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of non-
public information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a duty owed not to a
trading party, but to the source of the information.
521 U.S. at 652–53.
45. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52.  The shareholder typically is either a former share-
holder, if the insider buys securities, or a future shareholder, if the insider sells securities.
This oversimplifies reality for the purpose of explication, because the shareholder may
choose to sell only a portion of his ownership position or may buy additional shares in a
corporation in which he already has an ownership position.
46. 445 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980).
47. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for
the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 15 (1998).
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individuals actually owe fiduciary duties to their employers,48 not to
the shareholders of those corporations.49  Moreover, even assuming,
arguendo, the relationship between a corporation’s employees and its
shareholders could be characterized as fiduciary, the Chiarella Court
admitted that the shareholders to whom the insider owes this alleged
fiduciary duty need not even own shares until after the completion of
the insider trading transaction.50  As such, the relationship creating
the insider trading liability cannot be accurately characterized as the
alleged fiduciary duty owed by employees to shareholders, because the
breach of the fiduciary duty would precede the creation of the fiduciary
relationship.  More accurately, this theory recognizes that liability de-
rives from a fiduciary obligation that an insider owes the issuer of the
security traded, that is, the obligation of an employee to his em-
ployer.51  Regardless of the theory’s true foundation, the classical the-
ory (as the name suggests), narrowly defines insider trading.
The facts of Chiarella help explain the classical theory.  In this
case, Chiarella, the markup man for a financial printer, obtained con-
fidential information about a corporate takeover by decoding the ma-
terial given to his employer.52  Chiarella used the information to
purchase stock in the target company with which he had no employ-
ment or other fiduciary connection.53  After the takeover was an-
nounced, Chiarella then sold the stock at a profit.54  The government
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty
to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relation-
ship.”); see, e.g., Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating
that corporate officers “owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporate employer not to
(1) actively exploit their positions within the corporation for their own personal benefit, or
(2) hinder the ability of a corporation to continue the business for which it was devel-
oped”) (citations omitted).
49. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 265, 310 (1998) (“Although board members ‘resemble agents in that they act on
behalf of others and are fiduciaries owing duties of loyalty and care,’ they owe these duties
‘to the corporation itself rather than to the shareholders individually or collectively.’”)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (1958)).
50. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 n.21,
914 n.23 (1961)).
51. Throughout this Article, for simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the relationship giving
rise to classical liability for insider trading as between either the employee and the corpora-
tion or the employee and the shareholders—recognizing that the explanation above pro-
vides more detail on this issue.
52. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
53. Id. at 224, 232–33.  By definition, Chiarella purchased the stock from shareholders
of the target company—persons with whom he had no connection. Id. at 232–33.
54. Id. at 224.
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investigated, indicted, and convicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of
violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.55
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella’s conviction because, ac-
cording to the Court, he had no duty to disclose his intention to trade
or to abstain from trading on the confidential information because he
was neither an explicit insider (employee) nor a fiduciary or quasi-
insider (such as an accountant or a lawyer), and did not have any
fiduciary relationship with those with whom he traded.56  Under com-
mon law rules, silence constitutes fraud only if the defendant has a
duty to disclose, a duty that typically flows from a fiduciary relation-
ship.57  The Court stated that the Act “cannot be read ‘more broadly
than its language . . . permit[s]’” and that although Section 10(b)
serves as a catchall provision, “what it catches must be fraud.”58  The
Court, therefore, rejected the broader “parity-of-information” theory,
a theory that creates liability when any person trades on information
not generally available on the market without first disclosing that in-
formation to the public.59  The Court refused to consider whether
Chiarella’s conviction could have been affirmed based on a duty he
owed to his employer (the financial printer) to keep the information
55. Id. at 225.
56. Id. at 232–33, 235.  The Court held that a duty to disclose arises only “when one
party has information ‘that [another] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation’” between the two. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (1976)).  Therefore, a person who is neither an insider nor a fiduciary has no
obligation to disclose such information to anyone. Id. at 229.  In fact, the Court noted that
Chiarella was not an agent, fiduciary, or a person in which the sellers had placed their
trust; instead, he was “a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through imper-
sonal market transactions.” Id. at 232–33.
57. See Sw. E & T Suppliers, Inc. v. Am. Enka Corp., 463 F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1972)
(“Texas law is clear that if there is no confidential or fiduciary relation between the parties
[creating a duty to disclose], mere silence does not amount to fraud or misrepresenta-
tion.”); Cole v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 46 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Iowa 1951)
(“[S]ilence of a defendant does not amount to fraudulent concealment . . . unless a fiduci-
ary relation exists between plaintiff and defendant, imposing upon the latter the duty to
reveal to the former all facts which might affect his interest.”); Friedman v. Jablonski, 358
N.E.2d 994, 997 n.3 (Mass. 1976) (stating that silence constitutes fraudulent concealment
only in a fiduciary relationship); Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1985)
(stating that silence may amount to fraud where a fiduciary relationship exists).
58. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 578 (1979)).  The Court stated that not every instance of financial unfairness consti-
tutes fraudulent activity under Section 10(b). Id. at 232.
59. Id. at 233–35.  The Court noted that neither the language nor the legislative history
indicated that Section 10(b) was intended to recognize a general duty between all market
participants to abstain or disclose. Id. at 233.  This, however, was the only theory expressly
rejected by the Chiarella Court.  As will be seen later, this left the door open for application
of the misappropriation theory, as well as other possible interpretations. See infra Part
II.B.2.
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confidential because that theory—the “misappropriation theory”—
was not submitted to the jury.60
Thus, Chiarella could be read to confine insider trading liability to
insiders and quasi-insiders.  But the Court side-stepped the issue of
whether the breach of other relationships of trust could give rise to
insider trading violations by refusing to consider the issue for proce-
dural reasons.61  Accordingly, under the classical theory, current em-
ployees who trade on inside information are covered by Rule 10b-5
because they owe a direct duty to their employer not to trade on mate-
rial, nonpublic information about their employer gained by virtue of
their employment.62
The classical theory quickly expanded.  In SEC v. Cherif,63 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a former employee owes a common law duty to
his former employer “to protect any confidential information en-
trusted to him by his employer during his employment.”64  The court,
therefore, held that a former employee resembles a current employee
in his insider status, and, as such, “is obligated to continue to protect
such information after his termination.”65
The Supreme Court further broadened its Chiarella holding in
Dirks v. SEC by extending liability to “tippees”—those who receive ma-
terial, nonpublic information from persons who have a duty to dis-
close or abstain from trading.66  Dirks, a securities analyst, was told by
a former officer of a company that the company engaged in fraudu-
60. Id. at 235–36.  In response to the Chiarella decision, the SEC immediately promul-
gated Rule 14e-3, which prohibits anyone from trading on material, nonpublic information
about a tender offer without requiring that any particular relationship exist between the
trader and the source of the information.  Painter et al., supra note 16, at 167.  Under this R
rule, “[t]he relationship between the trader and the source of the information is irrele-
vant . . . .” Id. The Supreme Court has held that Rule 14e-3 is within the SEC’s rulemaking
authority.  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 676 (1997) (“[I]nsofar as it serves to
prevent the type of misappropriation charged against O’Hagan, Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper
exercise of the Commission’s prophylactic power under § 14(e).”).
61. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235–36.
62. See id. at 226–28.
63. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).  In this case, Danny Cherif falsified a memo stating
that his identification card should remain active after his termination because he would be
working part time on a special project, and he used this card to enter his former em-
ployer’s building after normal business hours for a year after his termination. Id. at 406.
During this time, Cherif obtained confidential information about transactions and targets
and used it to trade in the stocks of certain companies. Id.
64. Id. at 411.
65. Id.
66. 463 U.S. 646, 659–60 (1983). Dirks also provided that temporary insiders, such as
accountants or attorneys, can potentially be liable not only as tippees, but as tippers under
the classical theory. Id. at 655 n.14.
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lent activity.67  During his attempts to verify this information, Dirks
told others, and some of the tippees traded based on that informa-
tion.68  The Supreme Court articulated that tippees could be held lia-
ble just like traditional insiders.69  The Court reversed Dirks’s
conviction, however, because the person who tipped him off did not
breach a fiduciary duty to the company.70  The Court further stated
that tippers do not breach a fiduciary duty if they did not receive any
personal gain from revealing the information.71  The Court recog-
nized the innocent motives of Dirks and his tipper, and, therefore,
found them not liable.72
The Dirks Court limited the expansion of Rule 10b-5 liability to
tippees, continuing to require that the tipper in this context breach a
direct fiduciary obligation to the company whose confidential infor-
mation was the basis for the trade before imposing liability on the
tipper or the tippee.73  This maintained the classical theory’s insis-
tence on a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship between the com-
pany whose security was traded and the insider trader, although the
relationship was far more tenuous than the one described in
Chiarella.74
67. Id. at 648–49.
68. Id. at 649.  Because he played a critical role in exposing a massive fraud, the SEC
only censured Dirks. Id. at 651–52.
69. Id. at 660–61.  The Court said:
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not be-
cause they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made availa-
ble to them improperly.  And for Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider’s disclosure is
improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty.  Thus, a tippee as-
sumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on mate-
rial nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach.
Id. (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 666–67.
71. Id. at 662.  In response, Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent that “[t]he fact that
the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does not eradicate the shareholder’s
injury. . . .  Personal gain is not an element of the breach of this duty.” Id. at 673–74
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun also argued that Dirks’s actions should be
considered a violation; otherwise, the result would be “a disservice to this country’s attempt
to provide fair and efficient capital markets.” Id. at 679.
72. Id. at 666–67 (majority opinion). This element of the Dirks tipper-tippee liability
test, however, seems driven—like much of insider trading jurisprudence—by the specific
facts of the case.
73. Id. at 660–61.
74. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (delineating the
expansion of the fiduciary duty concept from Chiarella to Dirks).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-APR-08 7:17
2008] MERE THIEVES 583
2. The Misappropriation Theory
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Chiarella demon-
strated support by several members of the Court for the broader “mis-
appropriation theory.”  Under this theory, insider trading
prohibitions are extended to outsiders, or persons unaffiliated with
the corporation whose shares are traded.75  Indeed, in their minority
opinions, Chief Justice Burger76 and Associate Justices Brennan,77
Blackmun,78 and Marshall79 all agreed that a violation of Section
10(b) occurs whenever a person “improperly obtains” and uses mate-
rial, nonpublic information “in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.”80
The Chief Justice’s dissent in Chiarella supported the idea of an
absolute duty to disclose or abstain from trading if a person acquired
material, nonpublic information illegally, regardless of the source:
By their terms, these provisions reach any person engaged in
any fraudulent scheme. . . .  Just as surely Congress cannot
have intended one standard of fair dealing for “white collar”
insiders and another for the “blue collar” level.  The very lan-
guage of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “by repeated use of the
word ‘any’ [was] obviously meant to be inclusive.”81
The Chief Justice stated that his interpretation of the Rule was “in no
sense novel” because it followed logically from the In re Cady, Roberts
& Co.82 administrative decision that first stated the disclose or abstain
75. Roundtable on Insider Trading, supra note 40, at 10 (Professor Lawrence A. Cunning- R
ham, Benjamin N. Carodozo School of Law).
76. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Justice Brennan stated that he agreed with the
Chief Justice’s view of the substantive law, but he concurred in the judgment because he
believed the misappropriation theory was not presented to the jury in this case. Id. at 239.
78. Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun criticized the majority by
stating that “[t]he Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent decisions,
designed to transform § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic ‘catchall’ provision to one that
catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment in securities a
needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor.” Id.
79. Id. at 246.  Justice Marshall joined in Justice Blackmun’s dissent. Id. at 245.
80. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240–41 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).  The Chief Justice’s dissent outlined a
broad, “‘fraud on investors’ misappropriation theory.”  Nagy, supra note 3, at 1235.  The R
“fraud on investors” approach was somewhat successful in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981), in which the court held that the defendants had violated Rule 10b-5
despite the fact that their sources for the information were neither their employers nor
purchasers or sellers of a target company.
82. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).  In Cady, Roberts, a broker-dealer was found guilty of violating
Rule 10b-5 because he sold a large amount of company stock shortly after finding out
about the company’s decision to reduce dividends. Id. at 909, 911.  He acquired this infor-
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rule for corporate insiders.83  He asserted that the informational ad-
vantage gained by obtaining material information through unlawful
means demands consideration of the same factors the SEC considered
in Cady, Roberts to determine whether one has a duty to disclose: (1)
whether one had access to information that was intended only for a
corporate purpose and not a personal benefit; and (2) the inherent
unfairness in trading based on information unavailable to others in-
volved in the transaction.84  The SEC has long argued that the misap-
propriation theory extends beyond direct business relationships,85
and has stated that insiders such as officers, directors, and controlling
stockholders “do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there
is . . . an obligation” to “disclose material facts which are known to
them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their invest-
ment judgment.”86  Thus, according to Chief Justice Burger, when
someone has obtained inside information and wants to exploit it, that
person must either disclose the information or abstain from trading in
order to avoid liability under the Rule.87
Justice Blackmun echoed this sentiment in his Chiarella dissent,
stating that “[t]he Court has observed that the securities laws were not
intended to replicate the law of fiduciary relations.  Rather, their pur-
pose is to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal na-
tional securities markets where common law protections have proved
inadequate.”88  The minority, therefore, offered support for an in-
mation from a director of the company before the information had been publicly dis-
closed. Id. at 909.
83. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice maintained
that the majority opinion left open the question of the misappropriation theory’s validity
because it concluded that the question was not presented to the jury. Id. at 243.  Thus,
according to the Chief Justice, the Court’s actual holding was much narrower than its
discussion in the opinion indicated. Id. at 243 n.4.
84. Id. at 241–42.
85. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,729–30
(Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2007)) (specifying those relationships
in which a duty of trust or confidence automatically exists under the misappropriation
theory of insider trading); 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 6:489 (2d ed. 2007) (“Rule 10b5-
2 rejects the reasoning of Reed and Chestman [holding that a fiduciary business relationship
is required] and essentially turns the SEC positions [supporting nonbusiness-related liabil-
ity in those cases] into law.”).  Rule 10b5-2 was specifically intended not to apply to business
relationships.  SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1061 n.91 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
86. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911, 912.  The SEC stated that it was “not to be
circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classification.” Id. at 912.
87. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240–42 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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sider trading theory essentially based on parity of access to material
information.89
Seven years after Chiarella, the Court evenly divided90 over
whether to apply the misappropriation theory to a columnist who
used information from his not-yet-published column to trade securi-
ties featured in his column.91  In Carpenter v. United States,92 four Jus-
tices held that the defendant-columnist owed a duty to his employer,
the source and owner of the information on which he traded, and
further stated that the columnist’s actions satisfied the “in connection
with” requirement even though the victim of the fraud, the employer-
newspaper, was not a purchaser or seller of securities.93  In so doing,
the Justices asserted that “[t]he Journal had a property right in keep-
ing confidential and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the
89. Id. at 252 n.2.  The parity of access theory is premised on the idea of “investor
expectations regarding the relative accessibility of corporate information to market partici-
pants.”  Painter et al., supra note 16, at 163 n.39.  Another commentator remarked that R
[i]n Texas Gulf Sulfur, the SEC argued, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit accepted, the theory that the antifraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act require a parity of information among all traders in the public securi-
ties markets.  This did not mean that all investors should have precisely the same
information; rather, they should all enjoy access to the same information. . . .
[The] parity of information theory was eventually rejected.
Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 89. R
90. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).  The Court was split 4-4 because
Justice Kennedy had not yet filled the seat vacated by Justice Powell.  Nagy, supra note 3, at R
1238 n.70.  If Justice Powell had still been on the Court, the misappropriation theory likely
would have suffered defeat, as Justice Powell had influenced the decision to grant certio-
rari because he wanted the opportunity to deny the validity of the theory. Id.  Interestingly,
one commentator has stated that with Justice Powell’s retirement, the Court lost the only
member who could be labeled a “corporate lawyer,” and thus, the Court since then has
been criticized for the lack of logic, clarity, and usefulness of its securities law decisions.
Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central
Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 868 (1995).
91. In this case, R. Foster Winans co-authored the “Heard on the Street” column for
the Wall Street Journal, which discussed stocks and provided opinions about the investment
potential of each stock. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22.  Because the column had an excellent
reputation, it could affect the price of the stocks it discussed. Id.  The Wall Street Journal’s
policy was that the column’s content was confidential information until publication; how-
ever, Winans entered into a scheme by which he would inform others of the contents of
the column before publication so that they could trade based on the potential effect the
column would have on the market, and the group would share any profits obtained via this
scheme. Id. at 23.  The district court found that Winans had misappropriated confidential
information and was guilty of a Rule 10b-5 violation, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id.
at 23–24.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. at 24.
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schedule and contents of the . . . column.”94  But the Justices could
not find a fifth vote.95
In the meantime, several federal appellate courts, including the
Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, “adopted the misappro-
priation theory and applied it in a variety of fact patterns involving
both temporary insiders and the use of market information.”96  Lower
federal courts also applied the theory.97  But the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits rejected it.98  As such, many were left wondering how the mis-
appropriation theory would fare in the long run.99
The Supreme Court heard the appeal of the Eighth Circuit’s re-
jection of the misappropriation theory in United States v. O’Hagan.100
In O’Hagan, an attorney for a firm working on a potential tender offer
traded on information gained through his firm’s representation of the
acquirer.101  O’Hagan was charged with and convicted of, among
other counts, securities fraud, but a divided panel of the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed his conviction based on a rejection of the misappropria-
tion theory.102
94. Id. at 26.  In contrast, Judge Miner, dissenting in the Second Circuit’s decision in
the case, stated, “[t]o say that the ‘publication schedule’ of the Wall Street Journal was the
non-public, confidential information stolen by the defendants is to extend the sweep of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 beyond all reasonable bounds.”  United States v. Carpenter,
791 F.2d 1024, 1037 (2d Cir. 1986) (Miner, J., dissenting).
95. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. The Court upheld the conviction on mail fraud. Id.;
Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 93. R
96. Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 92 (citations omitted).  The Second, R
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits relied on the majority opinion in Chiarella when they adopted
the misappropriation theory. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir.
1991) (en banc) (cautiously extending the misappropriation theory to “new relation-
ships”); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991) (extending the misappropriation
theory to cover “outsiders” who would not normally be deemed fiduciaries); SEC v. Clark,
915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the misappropriation theory to circumstances
where the misappropriation involves violation of a fiduciary or similar duty).
97. DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION
AND ENFORCEMENT 489–90 (2003) (“[T]he Second Circuit was quick to give [the misappro-
priation] theory a warm embrace. . . .  Other Circuits soon followed.”) (citations omitted).
98. Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 93–94. R
99. See Painter et al., supra note 16, at 157.  Many were also confused because the ma- R
jority opinion in Chiarella seemed “both over-inclusive and under-inclusive[:]” it extended
a fiduciary duty to a context in which it was not recognized at common law, yet at the same
time ignored the fact that the common law recognizes some duties to disclose that were
very similar to the parity of information theory the majority seemed to reject.  Donald C.
Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1639, 1655 (2004).
100. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
101. Id. at 647.  The indictment alleged that O’Hagan used the profits to repay client
accounts from which he had embezzled money. Id. at 648.
102. Id. at 648–49.  The Eighth Circuit stated that “neither the statutory language of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), nor Supreme
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The Supreme Court reversed,103 holding that “criminal liability
under § 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory.”104
While Justice Ginsburg’s opinion applied a narrower version of the
theory than some circuits embraced,105 the Court held that misap-
propriators satisfy the deception requirement under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 because they “deal in deception” in that they feign
fidelity by “pretend[ing] loyalty to the principal while secretly con-
verting the principal’s information for personal gain.”106  Thus, like in
the classical theory, the Court satisfied the fraud requirement of Rule
10b-5 by equating it to the breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like obli-
gation, but now allowed this breach to satisfy the fraud requirement
regardless of whether the breach related to the shareholders of the
security being traded.107  O’Hagan was a quintessential outsider be-
cause he worked for the firm representing the acquirer when he
traded options of the target.108  Therefore, while the Court still vested
its decision in a breach of some relation of trust, this breach no longer
had to involve a relationship between an insider of a company and its
shareholders.109
In concluding that the misappropriation theory could support a
conviction for securities fraud, O’Hagan distinguished Chiarella and
Dirks.110  The Court stated that Chiarella did not resolve the question
Court precedent interpreting it, will support the use of the ‘misappropriation theory,’ the
theory which formed the basis for O’Hagan’s § 10(b) securities fraud convictions.”  United
States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613–14 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
103. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650 & n.3.
104. Id. at 650.
105. Roundtable on Insider Trading, supra note 40, at 11 (Professor Marcel Kahan, New R
York University School of Law).
106. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.  Thus, the victim in a misappropriation case is the source
of the information rather than the shareholders or investors.
107. Id. at 652–53.
108. Id. at 647, 653 n.5.
109. Id. at 652–53.  Moreover, the Chief Justice’s dissent in Chiarella foretold the poten-
tial for this much broader application.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240–41
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2006)
(discussing the misappropriation theory) (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–35 and
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652).
Under the misappropriation theory, as in the classical theory, the insider trader re-
ceived the inside information legally and through no breach of trust or relationship.  The
illegality arises from the fact that the trader used for himself the confidential information
belonging to someone else. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 16 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652).
That use of the confidential information without informing its owners constitutes the de-
ceptive act required under Rule 10b-5. Id.  Therefore, as the First Circuit recently stated,
under the Supreme Court’s formulation of the misappropriation theory, the misap-
propriator can avoid liability through the “safe-harbor” of disclosing his intentions to the
owner of the information. Id. at 12.
110. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 660–63.
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of liability under the misappropriation theory.111  The Court ex-
plained that its language in Chiarella that could be read as limiting
liability under Section 10(b) actually rejected only the idea that the
Section imposes an absolute duty between all market participants while
“carefully leaving for future resolution the validity of the misappropri-
ation theory . . . .”112
Similarly, the Court stated that Dirks did not foreclose the applica-
tion of the misappropriation theory because the case considered tip-
pee liability rather than misappropriator liability under Section 10(b).
The Court distinguished Dirks because the Dirks tippee was not ex-
pected to keep the information confidential and because he did not
misappropriate or illegally obtain the information.113  Thus, the
O’Hagan Court found that the Dirks decision also did not reject the
misappropriation theory.114
This new misappropriation theory extends liability for securities
violations beyond classical insiders115 to those who misappropriate
material, nonpublic information for use in a securities transaction in
violation of some fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty that they owe to a
party, regardless of whether that party issues or trades any of the ille-
gally traded stock.116  In other words, for the first time, the breach of a
fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship need not be directed at the
company whose stock was traded for the breach to satisfy the fraud
requirement of Rule 10b-5.117
The scope of this expansion cannot be underestimated.  But the
Supreme Court did little to aid the lower courts in logically defining
111. Id. at 661–62.
112. Id. at 662.
113. Id. at 662–63.
114. Id. at 663.  The Court asserted that because the case considered only the liability of
a tippee, Dirks did not foreclose the adoption of the misappropriation theory. Id.
115. Some have called these people “outsiders” because they are not inside the company
whose securities were traded. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining
outsiders as “persons who are neither insiders of the companies whose shares are being
traded, nor tippees of such insiders”).
116. Id.
117. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.  According to the Supreme Court,
a person commits fraud . . . and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.  Under this theory, a
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the
principal of the exclusive use of that information.
Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
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the contours of the fledging misappropriation theory.118  Indeed,
some criticize the current version of the misappropriation theory be-
cause it “does nothing for the confidence of a particular investor [be-
cause] liability is untethered to conduct harming investor
confidence.”119
III. RULE 10B-5 AND “MERE THIEVES”120
Conventional wisdom had held that mere thieves cannot be liable
for trading on stolen confidential information because they lack a fi-
duciary relationship to the source of the information and, therefore,
do not deceive that source.121  At least one commentator, however,
admits that the misappropriation theory could extend to situations in
118. Painter et al., supra note 16, at 187 (“Once the Court decided that corporate outsid- R
ers in possession of material, nonpublic information have no duty to disclose that informa-
tion to the persons with whom they trade, the Court foreclosed any logical way to reach
trading by such outsiders under Section 10(b).”).
119. Bach T. Hang, Note, The SEC’s Criminal Rulemaking in Rule 10b5-2: Incarceration
Should be Made of Sterner Stuff, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 629, 630 (2002).  The author goes substan-
tially further by stating that “the SEC periodically generates headlines announcing that
some poor soul has been charged with insider trading.  The Theory exists to sacrifice bod-
ies and careers on the altar of investor confidence.” Id.; see also Smith, supra note 3, at 1015 R
(stating that “the concepts of market integrity and fairness are at the mercy of a technical-
ity”).  Further, “[i]t is also hard to justify the disparate treatment between two people who
trade on nonpublic information and create the same degree of harm on the every day
investor based solely on the source of their nonpublic information.” Id. at 1014–15.
120. The term “mere thieves” could encompass a number of persons, including
computer hackers who obtain confidential information about upcoming mergers or
transactions, burglars who steal such information, or someone who steals documents out of
another’s briefcase while that person is out of the room.
121. Painter et al., supra note 16, at 181; Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider R
Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1526–27 (1999) (arguing that “Rule 10b-5 simply
does not bar the use of unlawfully acquired information,” and, therefore, the misappropri-
ation theory does not apply to mere thieves because they do not actually deceive anyone);
Smith, supra note 3, at 1014 (“Under O’Hagan’s [sic] version of the misappropriation the- R
ory, a person may avoid liability by . . . obtaining the information by theft if one is not
standing in a fiduciary relationship with the source . . . .”); see Nagy, supra note 3, at 1255 R
(opining that “it is doubtful that securities trading by the computer hacker or the ‘mere’
thief would violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, because neither scenario would involve
misappropriation through acts that would constitute affirmative deception”); see also
Bayne, supra note 2, at 64 (recognizing that under the Original Theory, “Mere Thieves had R
no Duty to forgo the Insider Trade.  Only Trusted Thieves were held to a Duty under
Section 10(b)”); Randall W. Quinn, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 894 (2003) (arguing that mere thieves are not liable
unless they are former employees who manage to steal information as imposters). But see
Roundtable on Insider Trading, supra note 40, at 31 (Judge Ralph K. Winter, United States R
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) (suggesting that judges interpreting O’Hagan
“will hold that if [a] trader steals [a] briefcase from [a] lawyer and uses the information in
it[, then] he has misappropriated it and . . . it will be a 10b-5 violation”).
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which there is an element of intentional deception related to the
trade, but no fiduciary relationship.122  Moreover, some scholars ar-
gue that there should be a duty to disclose any information obtained
via an illegal act,123 regardless of “[w]hether one calls this a misappro-
priation or not.”124  Finally, while some have suggested that these
mere thieves do not create a problem worthy of attention,125 the fact
that the SEC recently addressed the issue demonstrates that mere
thieves are in fact a serious concern.
In SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann,126 the SEC sued Lohmus
Haavel & Viisemann (LHV), an Estonian investment company, and
two LHV employees, alleging that the defendants hacked into a web-
site and stole investment-related press releases before they were pub-
licly disseminated.127  The defendants then allegedly traded on the
stolen information.128  One defendant filed a motion to dismiss, as-
serting that the SEC failed to allege sufficient facts for a fraud viola-
122. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVEN-
TION § 6.14 (2007).
123. See Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 109 (asserting that the misappropria- R
tion theory is too narrow to prevent trading on information obtained by illicit means);
Nagy, supra note 3, at 1252 (arguing that the misappropriation theory as adopted in R
O’Hagan is much too narrow to accommodate more sophisticated cases, including those
involving mere thieves).  Some have gone even further and argued that although Rule 10b-
5 could be read as protecting only those who can be classified as investors, it has been
“stretched” to cover other persons.  Thomas Lee Hazen & David L. Ratner, The Jurispru-
dence of SEC Rule 10b-5, http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_files/thumbs/rtf/35Hazen10b-
5CG010_thumb.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).  This argument suggests not only that the
fraud on investors approach applies, but also that the protection of those traditionally
thought to be protected under the Rule (the sources of the information) are actually exten-
sions of the Rule rather than the basis for the Rule.
124. LANGEVOORT, supra note 122, § 6.14. R
125. See Quinn, supra note 121, at 895–96, 895 n.163 (discussing commentators who R
argue that Rule 10b-5 should not apply to thieves trading based on stolen securities
information).
126. No. 05-CV-9259 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007).
127. Complaint, supra note 5, at 1–2.  The defendants electronically stole confidential R
information from Business Wire, a company that collects, edits, and disseminates press
releases from its clients to the public. Id. at 5–6.  The information obtained in Lohmus
Haavel & Viiseman included the identity of the issuer, the purpose and substance of the
release, and the schedule for release to the public. Id. at 8.
128. Id. at 2.  The Complaint alleged as follows:
In connection with more than 360 confidential press releases issued by more than
200 U.S. public companies, defendants LHV, Peek, and Lepik, through a series of
fraudulent acts, repeatedly have electronically stolen material non-public infor-
mation from a secure website for the purpose of executing hundreds of securities
trades based on that information, successfully making at least $7.8 million in the
process.
Id.  The SEC was alerted to the scheme when several accounts experienced higher than
normal trading prior to a particular merger. Id. at 4.  In short, if the release contained
positive information, then the defendants would purchase the security or call option; if the
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tion under Section 10(b) or an insider trading violation under Rule
10b-5.129  This case provided the first opportunity for the court to ap-
ply Rule 10b-5 liability to mere thieves.  The court issued a preliminary
injunction in favor of liability, but did not issue a final disposition be-
cause the defendants settled without admitting or denying liability.130
Thereafter, in SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd.,131 the Southern District of
New York again faced the issue of whether stealing/hacking and trad-
ing amounts to a violation of Rule 10b-5.  Again, the court issued a
preliminary injunction initially supporting liability for mere thieves.132
The case concluded with a verdict of liability under 10b-5, but was
decided by default judgment without opinion.133
Finally, just a few months ago, in SEC v. Dorozhko, the Southern
District of New York confronted this issue for a third time.134  In
Dorozhko, a Ukranian man allegedly hacked into a computer system of
a NYSE-listed company’s investor relations firm, stole confidential in-
formation, and traded on it.135  This time, however, the trial court
held that stealing/hacking and trading does not violate Rule 10b-5—
distinguishing the district’s prior two inchoate cases.136
The remainder of this Article presents a jurisprudential analysis
demonstrating that “mere thieves” violate Rule 10b-5 when they trade
on stolen, confidential financial information, whether viewed as sim-
ple fraud or insider trading.
Moreover, good policy supports this growing course of case law.
Applying 10b-5 liability to mere thieves promotes consistency because
thieves cannot avoid criminal liability for trading on stolen, nonpublic
information.137  Full application of Rule 10b-5 to mere thieves prop-
information was negative, then they would effectuate a short sale of the security or buy a
put option. Id. at 10–11.
129. Memorandum of Law in Support of Oliver Peek’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
and to Vacate the Order of Preliminary Injunction, Freeze of Assets and Other Relief at
1–3, SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05-CV-9259 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007).
130. The settlement required the defendants to refrain from violating Rule 10 and to
disgorge their $13 million in profits.  Litigation Release No. 20134, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Court Issues Final Judgment by Consent Against Defendants Oliver
Peek and Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann (May 31, 2007), http://sec.gov/litigation/li-
treleases/2007/lr20134.htm.
131. No. 07-CV-1380 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007), cited in SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07-
Civ-9606 (NRB), 2008 WL 126612, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. No. 07-Civ-9606 (NRB), 2008 WL 126612 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *2.
137. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries, Misappropriators and the Murky Outlines of the Den
of Thieves: A Conceptual Continuum for Analyzing United States v. O’Hagan, 33 TULSA L.J. 163,
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erly orders penalties for wrongdoers by recognizing that the miscon-
duct committed by thieves is more culpable than that committed by
employees.  While the Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Cherif reached the
opposite conclusion, stating that a person owing a fiduciary-type duty
“betray[s] a trust in a way that a mere thief does not,”138 this conclu-
sion seems misguided.  The distinction should not benefit thieves be-
cause, whereas a person with a fiduciary interest obtains information
lawfully and uses it unlawfully, a thief both obtains and uses informa-
tion unlawfully.  Therefore, the thief should be punished more, not
less, than the person who obtained the information legally.139
A. Simple Fraud
Federal statute defines “[f]raud and related activity in connection
with computers” as “intentionally access[ing] a computer without au-
thorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby ob-
tain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer if the conduct
involved an interstate or foreign communication.”140  Hacking is one
of the most likely methods by which mere thieves steal confidential
information from companies with whom they are otherwise unrelated.
Thus, given that federal statute explicitly defines this behavior as
fraud,141 the argument that mere thieves in the context of computer
hacking are liable under Rule 10b-5’s simple fraud prohibition is
convincing.
172–73 (1997) (commenting that the misappropriation theory focuses on protecting inves-
tors from being “unfairly cheated” by trades made by those with “informational
advantages”).
138. 933 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 1991).
139. This distinction was cleverly outlined in Professor Painter’s classroom Honor Code
after the O’Hagan case:
You may use your own outline on this exam.  You may also use an outline that has
been entrusted to you by someone else, but you must tell the other person that
you are using her outline on the exam.  You do not need her permission.  You
may furthermore use outlines that you steal from other persons before or during
the exam, so long as those outlines were not entrusted to you by anybody.
Painter et al., supra note 16, at 153. R
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).  The statute is also cited in Plain-
tiff’s Response, supra note 5, at 11. R
141. The fact that the federal statute defines hacking as fraud is helpful, but it is not
necessary; the SEC has stated that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “not intended as a
specification of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed
to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others.”  Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).  As such, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were drafted as broad remedial provisions directed toward mislead-
ing or deceptive practices, regardless of whether they were technically sufficient to satisfy
the common law (or statutory) requirements for fraud or deceit. Id. at 910.
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By analogy, if a thief physically breaks into a corporation’s head-
quarters, steals confidential information, and trades on it, Rule 10b-
5(a) equally applies.142  Physical entry, like computer hacking, typi-
cally requires deception to access/remove the secret information, as
the thief would need to mislead the security (be it human or elec-
tronic) protecting the confidential information.143
While surreptitious thievery is not universally viewed as fraud, it
certainly can be.  For example, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and most comparable state rules, permit a party to impeach a
witness with a prior conviction involving “dishonesty or false state-
ment.”144  In this context, one court stated that “[t]he crime of shop-
lifting [essentially defined as surreptitious thievery] . . . is dishonest
and contains elements of deceit.”145  This opinion suggests a similar
outcome for defining mere thievery as fraud under Rule 10b-5.  While
there is a split of authority regarding “whether theft crimes such as . . .
shoplifting should be categorized as crimen falsi, [and] historically
they have not been,”146 the standard of “dishonesty or false statement”
is much narrower than the fraud and deceit element of Rule 10b-5.
Courts have been far more willing to broadly interpret the elements of
Rule 10b-5 than they have been in relaxing the standards for the ad-
mission of impeachment evidence.147  As such, courts would not be
dramatically altering the legal landscape of insider trading jurispru-
dence by including thievery within the rubric of 10b-5 fraud.
B. Insider Trading
In addition to analyzing a simple fraud claim, it is valuable to
examine whether mere thieves violate the insider trading prohibition
of Rule 10b-5 because insider trading liability gives rise to treble dam-
142. See Quinn, supra note 121, at 894–95, for a brief discussion of when a thief might R
and might not be engaging in deception.  What remains an open question, perhaps, is an
obvious invasion of a company and theft of information.  Such an act may not satisfy any of
the fraud or deception elements of Rule 10b-5, although it seems an unlikely method of
acquiring such confidential information. Cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: IN-
SIDER TRADING 116 (2d ed. 2007) (see section entitled “Liability for brazen
misappropriators”).
143. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 910 (concluding that Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 should be read broadly to target all misleading or deceptive activities); see also BAIN-
BRIDGE, supra note 142, at 3 (discussing Rule 10b-5 securities fraud liability based upon R
either “deception” or “manipulation”).
144. FED. R. EVID. 609(a); Laird v. State, 755 So. 2d 489, 491 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
145. Laird, 755 So. 2d at 491.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. See supra Part II.B.2.
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ages in enforcement actions, while simple fraud claims do not.148  For
years, courts have attempted to address insider trading under Rule
10b-5 on an ad-hoc basis, rarely dealing squarely with corporate
theft.149  As a result, courts have infrequently discussed whether mere
thieves of confidential information violate the Rule by trading on sto-
len, nonpublic material information.  This section discusses the lan-
guage of Rule 10b-5, the policy behind it, and the relevant case law
interpreting and developing insider trading jurisprudence in order to
demonstrate that mere thieves are liable for insider trading under the
Rule.
The classical theory began the complicated topology of insider
trading jurisprudence,150 and the landscape expanded with the con-
tinually growing misappropriation theory.151  And, while the misap-
propriation theory has been accepted, the limits of its application
remain unclear to courts, commentators, potential victims, and viola-
tors.152  The following subsections analyze whether the misappropria-
tion theory still requires a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty and, if not,
whether mere thieves violate Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation
theory.
1. Beyond Fiduciary Relationships
O’Hagan and its progeny should not be read as requiring a fiduci-
ary relationship under the misappropriation theory.153  Both the un-
148. Roundtable on Insider Trading, supra note 40, at 37 (Ralph K. Winter, Judge, United R
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) (“You can get treble damages and attor-
neys’ fees.”); compare 15 U.S.C. §78u-1(a) (2000) with 15 U.S.C. §78u(d) (2000 & Supp. V
2005).
149. The SEC, not surprisingly, has been less reticent in setting forth its position on this
issue. See, e.g., Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 n.18 (1971) (“Our formulation
would clearly attach responsibility in a situation where the recipient knew or had reason to
know the information was obtained by industrial espionage, commercial bribery or the
like.”).
150. See Pritchard, supra note 47, at 14–15 (discussing that the Court’s decisions in R
Chiarella v. United States and SEC v. Dirks were the first to pronounce law on insider trading,
establishing the classical theory).
151. Craig W. Davis, Misappropriators, Tippees and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What We Can
Still Learn from Cady, Roberts, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 263, 296 (2004).
152. See United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he SEC
release described the law . . . regarding the scope of misappropriation liability as ‘unset-
tled.’”); Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7,
S7 (1993) (“Rule 10b-5’s survival is largely due to the flexibility of its language which has
enabled the rule to embrace malleable social perceptions of the securities market and the
securities business.”).
153. Roundtable on Insider Trading, supra note 40, at 27 (Professor Marcel Kahan, New R
York University School of Law) (“[T]he way I read O’Hagan, it does not take a fiduciary
duty to misappropriate.”).
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derlying purpose of the misappropriation theory and courts’
interpretation of it demonstrate that the theory encompasses the acts
of nonfiduciaries.154  Justice Blackmun agreed in his Chiarella dissent,
stating that:
persons having access to confidential material information
that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited
154. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 121, at 1511, 1514 (opining that “[f]iduciary breaches R
are not only insufficient for Rule 10b-5 liability, they are not even necessary,” and that “we
must abandon our unwarranted fixation on fiduciary breaches and acknowledge that Rule
10b-5 actually targets deceptions”).  Professor Prakash also suggests that despite our fixa-
tion on and fascination with insider trading, a large body of case law premises Rule 10b-5
liability on situations not involving material, nonpublic information or breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. at 1536.  One commentator has even gone so far as to describe the fiduciary duty
“requirement” as “the deus ex machina”—i.e., “the god out of a machine.”  David Cowan
Bayne, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: The Awakening, 1995, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
Rev. 487, 503 (1997) [hereinafter Bayne, The Awakening]. But see SEC v. Kornman, 391 F.
Supp. 2d 477, 484 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (agreeing that no fiduciary duty is required, but sug-
gesting that at least a fiduciary-like relationship need be present for liability under the
misappropriation theory).  The court explained that there is
“no general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions
based on material nonpublic information”; rather, the “misappropriation theory
bars only trading on the basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his
own use in violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the
owner or rightful possessor of the information.”
Id. at 484 (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 663 (1997)) (emphasis added).
One commentator asserts:
The law of Insider Trading is exactly where it was on the day the Eighth Circuit
handed down O’Hagan.  The Ginsburg Opinion never directly faced the concise
question posed by the five Circuits: Does the Misappropriation Theory conform
to Section 10(b)?
Because Justice Ginsburg avoided this question judicially, and founded her
holding on a New Theory not before the Court, all else about the Misappropria-
tion Theory itself is obiter.
Bayne, supra note 2, at 1–2.  Bayne found support for his position in Justice Thomas’s R
dissenting opinion in O’Hagan:
[The Ginsburg Majority] engages in the “imaginative” exercise of constructing its
own misappropriation theory from whole cloth. . . .  [This] new theory . . . suffers
from a . . . dispositive flaw: It is not the theory offered by the Commission.  In-
deed, . . . this . . . completely novel . . . theory has never been proposed by the
Commission, much less adopted by rule or otherwise.
Id. at 1 (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 687 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part)).  However, Bayne’s conclusion might have been colored by his less-
than-favorable view of the misappropriation theory, which is evident in his admonition to
the SEC: “Stop pandering to the illogical [Misappropriation] Theory, . . . [and] [r]eturn to
your roots.  In memory of Chairman Cary, resurrect his excellent Cady, Roberts . . . .  Attack
the remaining errors that burden the traditional law imposed by some of the errant Cady,
Roberts progeny.”  Bayne, The Awakening, supra, at 533.  Bayne argued that the Fourth Cir-
cuit decision in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), which held that the
misappropriation theory is not valid, id. at 952, is “a watershed and the beginning of a new
era, a return to sanity and the long-successful, traditional years of Cady, Roberts . . . .”
Bayne, The Awakening, supra, at 489–90.
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by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their
structural informational advantage through trading in af-
fected securities.  To hold otherwise . . . is to tolerate a wide
range of manipulative and deceitful behavior.155
The subsequent development of the misappropriation theory
supports Justice Blackmun’s view.  Under the Second Circuit’s pre-
O’Hagan version of the misappropriation theory, the Court of Appeals
held in United States v. Chestman156 that more than a mere familial rela-
tionship must be shown to create a 10b-5 fiduciary relationship157 that
could be “breached” through the use of confidential information.158
Three years after O’Hagan, however, the SEC felt emboldened by the
Supreme Court’s endorsement and promulgated Rule 10b5-2 in re-
sponse to limitations on the misappropriation theory suggested in
Chestman.159  In Rule 10b5-2, the SEC defined the misappropriation
theory to cover three, nonexclusive, specific situations in which a duty
exists to keep information confidential.160
155. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing the Second Circuit’s prior accept-
ance of the misappropriation theory, but noting that the court would “tread cautiously in
extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships”).
157. Id. at 568, 570–71.  In Chestman, Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling
shareholder of the eponymous supermarket, decided to sell his shares to a competing
chain for a significant premium. Id. at 555.  Waldbaum told one relative, who told an-
other, and so on.  Each person told the next to keep the information confidential. Id.  The
penultimate recipient then provided an edited version to his stockbroker, Chestman, who
traded on it. Id.  The Court held that “a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he misappropri-
ates material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of
trust and confidence and uses that information in a securities transaction.” Id. at 566.
However, as discussed, the court found that the familial relationship alone did not satisfy
the relationship test. Id. at 568, 570–71.
158. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding the trial court’s
decision that the misappropriation and trading of material nonpublic information violates
Rule 10b-5).
159. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER, & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIA-
TIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 508 (2003).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2007).  This rule contains the following preliminary note:
This section provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a per-
son has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the “misappropriation” the-
ory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5.  The law of
insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 10b-5,
and Rule 10b5-2 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any other
respect.
Id.  Further, the rule specifies the following three “duties of trust or confidence,” which
exist “among others”:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of
sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasona-
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Specifically, Rule 10b5-2 states that if a “person receives or ob-
tains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent,
child, or sibling,” she presumably has a “duty of trust or confi-
dence . . . with respect to the information . . . .”161  In addition, the
rule specifies that a trust relationship subject to Rule 10b-5 exists when-
ever someone agrees to keep information in confidence or when par-
ties have a practice of sharing secrets such that the recipient of the
confidential information knows or should know that the provider of
the information expects confidentiality.162  The SEC stated that the
misappropriation theory applies to breaches of these “non-business re-
lationships”163 even though they are not fiduciary relationships.
Indeed, before enacting Rule 10b5-2, the SEC long argued that
the misappropriation theory extends beyond direct business relation-
ships;164 the SEC’s position did not even envision the necessity of a
fiduciary-like relationship.165  In Cady, Roberts, for example, the SEC
asserted that the classes of people obligated to disclose material facts
bly should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic informa-
tion expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from
his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person
receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or
confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she
neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the
source of the information expected that the person would keep the information
confidential, because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice of sharing and
maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding
to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
Id.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3) (2007).
162. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–(2).
163. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,729–30 (Aug. 24,
2000).
164. Id.; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 230 R
(stating the SEC’s proposed definition of insider trading).
165. Some have stated that “Rule 10b5-2 expands the boundaries of fiduciary relation-
ships to the point that ‘suggests that the misappropriation theory is not about fiduciary
relationships at all.’”  Smith, supra note 3, at 1022 n.136 (quoting D. Gordon Smith, The R
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1422 (2002) [hereinafter
Smith, The Critical Resource Theory]).  Gordon Smith states that Rule 10b5-2 “is about regu-
lating information dissemination in securities markets, and the animating principle is one
of equal access” to information.  Smith, The Critical Resource Theory, supra, at 1422.  Smith’s
assertion indicates support of a fraud-on-the-market approach rather than a fraud-on-the-
source approach. Contra Hang, supra note 119, at 659 (“Like its judicial predecessors, Rule R
10b5-2 is not ‘well-tuned to an animating purpose of [the 1934 Act]: to insure [sic] honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.’ . . .  [It] does not turn on the
effects of damage to the marketplace or buyers and sellers of securities.” (quoting United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997))).
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extends beyond corporate officers.166  The SEC maintained that the
obligation exists if two elements are present: (1) “the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone,” and (2) “the inherent unfairness in-
volved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”167  According to the
SEC, anyone satisfying these elements must either disclose or abstain
from trading.168
In enacting Rule 10b5-2 after O’Hagan, the SEC explicitly stated
that this broader definition of confidential relationships better re-
flects the purpose of the insider trading laws,169 which includes “pro-
tect[ing] investors and the fairness and integrity of the nation’s
securities markets against improper trading on the basis of inside
information.”170
Of course, the SEC’s interpretation is not binding law; indeed,
the SEC has a vested institutional interest in broad readings of the
rules that govern its ability to regulate market participants.171  This
bias notwithstanding, courts grant deference to SEC views, even if they
do not control.172  And, once adopted by the courts, the SEC’s views
certainly are law.
Those few courts that addressed Rule 10b5-2 essentially endorsed
the evisceration of the fiduciary-duty requirement of the misappropri-
ation theory.  The Eleventh Circuit, in SEC v. Yun,173 cited Rule 10b5-
166. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. R
167. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); see also supra note 84 and accompa- R
nying text.
168. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.  The SEC stated that an insider has “the affirmative
duty to make appropriate disclosures or dissociate himself from the transaction.” Id.
169. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,729 (Aug. 24,
2000).
170. Id.
171. See United States v. Lang, 766 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that a cen-
tral purpose of Section 10(b) was to enable the SEC “to deal with new manipulative [or
cunning] devices” in a flexible, non-restrictive manner) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201–03 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“While the
SEC’s opinion is not binding on this Court, it is persuasive given the SEC’s role in the
development of insider trading law through rule making and its enforcement
responsibilities.”).
173. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).  During negotiations for post-nuptial division of
assets, David Yun, the president of Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc., told his wife, Donna Yun,
that the price of Scholastic shares would drop on a certain date, and he told her to keep
the information confidential. Id. at 1267.  While Donna was discussing this information
with her divorce attorney on the telephone in her office, a co-worker entered her office
and overheard the information; Donna later discussed the information with that co-worker
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2 as support for its interpretation of the misappropriation theory that
recognizes a duty to keep information confidential absent any explicit
fiduciary duty.174  The court held that a husband’s reasonable expec-
tation that his wife would keep certain material information confiden-
tial created a duty of confidentiality that satisfied the up-until-now
fiduciary requirement of the misappropriation theory, even absent an
explicit fiduciary duty.175  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Second
Circuit’s pre-O’Hagan view,176 noting that a rule under which spouses
presumptively do not have a duty under the misappropriation theory,
“too narrowly defined the circumstances in which a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality is created between husband and wife.”177  That idea
was one of the expressly stated catalysts for the adoption of Rule 10b5-
2.178  Because the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 after the trading in
at a business function. Id. at 1268.  The co-worker then traded based on that information.
Id.  For a general discussion of this case and its place in insider trading history, see M.
Anne Kaufold, Note, Defining Misappropriation: The Spousal Duty of Loyalty and the Expectation
of Benefit, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1489 (2004), which concluded that in Yun, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit settled two disputed theories of insider trading liability by requiring that, in insider
trading misappropriation actions, the SEC prove that the alleged misappropriator actually
intended to benefit from the tip. Id. at 1503.
174. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273 n.23.
175. Id. at 1272–74.  Specifically, the court stated that “a spouse who trades in breach of
a reasonable and legitimate expectation of confidentiality held by the other spouse suffi-
ciently subjects the former to insider trading liability.” Id. at 1272–73.  The court held that
the SEC had provided sufficient evidence that the Yuns had “an agreement of confidential-
ity and a history or pattern of sharing and keeping of business confidences,” that Yun
agreed to maintain that confidentiality, and that Yun’s husband had a reasonable expecta-
tion that Yun would keep the information confidential. Id. at 1273–74.
176. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that mar-
riage alone is not sufficient to create the requisite duty under the misappropriation theory
despite one spouse trading in breach of the other spouse’s reasonable expectation that the
information would be kept confidential).
177. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272.
178. Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule, Selective Disclosure and In-
sider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,602 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1065-2) states:
[T]he Chestman majority’s approach does not fully recognize the degree to which
parties to close family and personal relationships have reasonable and legitimate
expectations of confidentiality in their communications.  For this reason, we be-
lieve the Chestman majority view does not sufficiently protect investors and the
securities markets from the misappropriation and resulting misuse of inside
information.
Id.  The SEC’s statement of the final rule referenced this part of the Proposed Rule in its
discussion of Rule 10b5-2.  Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,729–30 (Aug. 24, 2000).  Additionally, courts’ discussion of Rule 10b5-2 demonstrate
that the SEC intended to counteract the decision in Chestman by adopting this rule.  The
court in Yun quoted the previous language from the SEC’s statement about the proposed
rule and concluded that the SEC’s intention to adopt the dissent’s position in Chestman
supported its determination that a duty of confidentiality existed between a husband and
his wife when the husband had a reasonable expectation that the wife would keep material
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Yun occurred, it did not apply.179  Thus, the court’s expansion of the
misappropriation theory beyond explicit fiduciary duties arose inde-
pendently of the rule, although it was informed by its purpose.
In United States v. Kim,180 the defendant, a member of the Young
Presidents Organization (YPO),181 received information from another
YPO member about a potential merger.182  The members of the YPO
were required to comply with a written “Confidentiality Commit-
ment,” which stated that “all information shared by the membership
must be held in absolute confidence.”183  The court stated that Rule
10b5-2 would have applied had it been adopted before the criminal
conduct occurred.184  Because the court could not apply Rule 10b5-2,
it held, citing Chestman, that the YPO member was not liable under
the misappropriation theory.185
Yun and Kim demonstrate that the SEC’s rulemaking authority
expanded courts’ views of the scope of liability under the misappropri-
ation theory.186  These cases also establish that courts have interpreted
information confidential. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273 n.23.  Similarly, the court in United States
v. Kim quoted this language and stated that “[t]he SEC’s dissatisfaction with the law at the
time as set forth in Chestman (which governs this case) is clear.”  184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
179. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273 n.23.
180. 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  For a critique of this case, see generally
Nathan Heyde, Note, Can You Keep a Secret?  The “Similar Relationship of Trust and Confidence”
in Misappropriation Theory: U.S. v. Kim, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 653 (2004), which highlights
the flaws in the Kim court’s analysis and application of the misappropriation theory.
181. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1014.
185. Id. at 1014–15.  The court explained:
The defendant concedes that under the current regulation, which became effec-
tive August 24, 2000, the indictment alleges facts amounting to criminal misap-
propriation.  The new regulation defines three non-exclusive circumstances
under which “a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the ‘mis-
appropriation’ theory of insider trading” for purposes of Rule 10b-5.  They are:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) When-
ever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the per-
son to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences . . . or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic
information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling  . . . .  Both the first
and second scenarios would apply to defendant’s conduct in this case.  The fact
that the SEC saw a need to adopt this new rule adds force to the argument that
the conduct it covers was not legally proscribed before adoption of the rule.
Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
186. The opinion of a Texas district court further demonstrates this by stating that the
“determination that the complaint has sufficiently alleged a fiduciary-like relationship to
withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss is bolstered by the SEC’s statements in adopting
Rule 10b5-2 . . . [and] [t]hese allegations . . . bring this case within Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).”
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the misappropriation theory as sufficiently broad to impose liability
even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship.  Moreover, despite
some concern that the SEC overreached its authority in promulgating
Rule 10b5-2,187 the courts have ensconced the Rule in the contempo-
rary legal landscape.
Courts and the SEC have emphasized that the Rule is nonexclu-
sive and extends beyond those fiduciaries liable under the misappro-
priation theory.188  But, up to that point, courts had still tethered
liability to the existence of some duty of trust—however amorphous
SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489–90 (N.D. Tex. 2005).  The court held that the
defendant who, in the process of unsuccessfully soliciting the opportunity to advise “execu-
tives in connection with their personal wealth management,” became privy to confidential
information about the executives and their respective corporations, sufficiently satisfied
the requirements of the misappropriation theory to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 492;
see also Goldman, Sachs & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 48,436, 80 SEC Docket 2906
(Sept. 4, 2003), available at 2003 WL 22056978, at *1, *5–6 (holding that the defendant, a
Washington, D.C.-based political consultant hired by Goldman Sachs, who attended a press
conference with embargoed information, violated a duty of trust or confidence under Rule
10b5-2 when he told others that the Treasury Department was going to suspend future
bond issuances before the Department made its official announcement).  For further ex-
ample, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted the
guilty plea of a criminal defendant to one count of insider trading under Rule 10b5-2
based on the defendant’s trading on information obtained from his cohabitating girl-
friend.  United States v. Edelman, No. 06 CR 0002 (RWS), 2006 WL 1148701, at *1, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).  In this case, Edelman was guilty of violating the rule because he
breached a duty of trust and confidentiality based on a history, pattern, and practice of
sharing confidences and a reasonable expectation that the confidentiality would be main-
tained. Id. at *3–4.
187. See, e.g., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 85, § 6:493 (opining that the “SEC’s R
proposal that certain family relationships or the sharing of confidences imposes a duty is
far-reaching, controversial and open to question”); John J. Falvey, Jr., The New SEC Rules on
Insider Trading: The Criminal Implications, 6 No. 13 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 14, 18
(2001) (stating that “there remains a viable argument that the SEC’s effort in Rule 10b5-2
to define when such a duty exists in nonbusiness relationships exceeds its rule-making
authority and effectively eliminates Section 10(b)’s requirement of breach of a fiduciary
duty or its equivalent”); Ray J. Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships
as a Basis for Insider Trading Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 492 (2002) (stating that
Rule 10b5-2 “is outside of the SEC’s authority under Rule 10b-5”).  Falvey noted, however,
that this argument would have to overcome the courts’ high level of deference to the SEC’s
rulemaking power under Section 10(b).
188. Some have argued that because of this fact, Rule 10b5-2 “has established the impor-
tant doctrine of inside trading on a base of quicksand.”  Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in
Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 461 (2004).  Indeed, some commentators have
even suggested that the SEC should argue for “friendship” to be a relationship covered by
the breadth of Rule 10b5-2.  For instance, Ethan J. Leib remarked that
nothing should necessarily stop a court from taking notice that strong personal
relationships of friendship can be presumed to be confidential and can be the
basis of misappropriation liability under Rule 10b5-2.  The SEC has rejected
Chestman—and those interested in having the law protect friendship could urge
courts to recognize friendships’ duties of confidentiality in the 10b-5 insider trad-
ing context.
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and all-encompassing that obligation may have been defined.  This
not-so-slow expansion of what satisfied the misappropriation theory’s
relationship test, however, reached a watershed point last year—re-
sulting in the final death-knell to any relationship-of-confidence ele-
ment of the misappropriation theory.
In SEC v. Rocklage,189 the defendant, who shared with her brother
nonpublic information that she received from her husband, despite
her husband’s indication that the information should remain confi-
dential, did not even challenge the application of Rule 10b5-2.190  The
First Circuit affirmed191 the lower court’s refusal to dismiss the case
for failure to state a claim that the wife utilized a “manipulative or
deceptive device that was in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”192
In its discussion of the misappropriation theory, the Rocklage
court explained:
“[T]he misappropriation theory premises liability on a fidu-
ciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him
with access to confidential information.”  Such deceptive
trading exploits unfair informational disparities in the secur-
ities market; making such trading illegal also comports with
the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b).
* * *
Finally, our interpretation finds further support in the inves-
tor protection purposes of § 10(b).  One of the animating
purposes of the statute was to “insure honest securities mar-
kets and thereby promote investor confidence.”  It furthers
that purpose if the “in connection with” requirement
reaches schemes in which one party deceptively and inten-
tionally obtains material nonpublic information to enable
another to trade with an unfair informational advantage.193
The Rocklage court’s emphasis on the broad social purposes of
Rule 10b-5’s protection of the markets from traders with an “unfair
informational advantage” and diminished focus on the specific, albeit
Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 694 (2007); see also Grzebielski,
supra note 187, at 468 (“This Article argues that the sharing of corporate information be- R
tween family members and friends should be treated as if the information was acquired
incident to a fiduciary relationship. Consequently, when the recipient of the information
uses it to trade in securities, that person violates Rule 10b-5.”).
189. 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
190. Id. at 3, 7.
191. Id. at 14.
192. Id. at 3, 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 6, 10–11 (citations omitted) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S.
813, 819–20 (2002); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)).
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often illusory, elements of the misappropriation test set the stage for
the subsequent critical part of the court’s analysis.  Here, Rocklage dis-
cussed the “safe harbor” provision of O’Hagan,194 which allowed mis-
appropriators to avoid liability by disclosing the intention to trade to
the party from whom the confidential information was acquired.  This
safe harbor exists under O’Hagan because the Supreme Court defined
the deception requirement of Rule 10b-5 as the fiduciary’s failure to
disclose to the owner of the confidential information his intention to
trade on that nonpublic material.195  Pursuant to O’Hagan, therefore,
a trader avoids violating Rule 10b-5 simply by disclosing his trading
intentions to the source of the confidential information—even if the
source strenuously objects—because no fiduciary obligation is
breached.196
With this background, Rocklage stated:
The [Supreme] Court [in O’Hagan] did say, however, that
“[b]ecause the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information,
if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade
on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’
and thus no § 10(b) violation.”  It is this language in
O’Hagan, arguably dicta, on which defendants pin their argu-
ment: they contend that Mrs. Rocklage’s disclosure to her
husband eliminated any deception involved with her tipping,
which would mean that her actions did not come within the
text of § 10(b).197
Rocklage distinguished the dicta of O’Hagan to eviscerate the dis-
closure option under the misappropriation theory, stating that the de-
fendant’s pre-trade disclosure to her husband did not allow her to
194. See supra Part II.B.2.
195. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.  The Court distinguished its holding in Santa Fe Industries
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479–80 (1977), in which the Court held that more than a mere
breach of fiduciary duty is required for a Section 10(b) violation.  In that case, however,
there was full disclosure of the pertinent facts relating to the transaction. Id. at 474.  This
can lead to some interesting holdings. See, e.g., Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1078–80
(10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an insider did not commit securities fraud when he asked a
shareholder to sell him shares and told the shareholder that he had information relevant
to the sale but would not disclose that information to the shareholder).
196. Painter et al., supra note 16, at 180.  Nevertheless, the O’Hagan Court also, and R
perhaps contradictorily, recognized that its misappropriation theory does not alleviate the
problems caused by insider trading because it fails to ameliorate any of the harm to inves-
tors when the misappropriator discloses to the source that he or she plans to trade on the
material, nonpublic information if the source does not disclose to the market. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. at 659 n.9.
197. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 7 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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avoid insider trading liability.198  This fundamentally altered the legal
basis for the misappropriation theory in a positive way.199
As such, Rocklage purged what was left of the fiduciary relation-
ship requirement from the misappropriation test.200  Liability under
the misappropriation theory after Rocklage must be premised on some-
thing other than the “fraud” of failing to disclose the intention to
trade on confidential information gained from a fiduciary or fiduci-
ary-like relationship.
Of course, the Supreme Court can reverse Rocklage, and other cir-
cuits can simply ignore the decision.  Indeed, as discussed above, one
district court recently rejected the idea that a trader can violate Rule
10b-5 by “hacking into a computer network and stealing material non-
public information.”201  The court, unaided by the above analysis,
held that
no federal court has ever held that the theft of material non-
public information by a corporate outsider and subsequent
trading on that information violates § 10(b). . . .  To elimi-
nate the fiduciary requirement now would be to undo de-
cades of Supreme Court precedent, and rewrite the law as it
has developed.  It is beyond the purview of this Court to do
so.202
Like the aforedescribed theories of liability under Rule 10b-5, the
Supreme Court will ultimately be called on to resolve this issue as well.
Given the Supreme Court’s pattern of broadening liability for insider
198. Id. at 12.
199. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 41, at 120.  As one noted commentator stated, R
“[a]lthough a misappropriator arguably deceives the source of the information [by failing
to disclose], any such deception is quite inconsequential.  The source of the information
presumably is injured, if at all, not by th[is] deception, but by the conversion of the infor-
mation by the misappropriator for his own profit.” Id. at 104–05.
200. The Rocklage court did attempt to distinguish its case from O’Hagan by asserting
that the defendant-wife, Mrs. Rocklage, used deception to acquire the confidential financial
information from her husband, rather than in the use of information—as was the case in
O’Hagan. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 3, 12.  In describing the facts in Rocklage, however, the court
articulated no relevant distinction between its case and O’Hagan.  The Rocklage court
pointed to two factors that qualified the defendant’s actions as deceptive acquisition of con-
fidential information: (1) the defendant’s agreement to pass on to her brother any confi-
dential information that she obtained from her husband; and (2) that she did not intend
to maintain her husband’s confidences. Id. at 3.  These factors identified by the Rocklage
court as relating to the acquisition of confidential information (which appear identical in
substance to each other), however, actually relate to the use of the information.
201. SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07-Civ-9606 (NRB), 2008 WL 126612, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
2008).
202. Id.
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trading, the Rocklage view seems the more likely outcome and the cor-
rect jurisprudence.
After Rocklage, liability under the misappropriation theory, at least
in the First Circuit, is premised on the parity-of-access theory alluded
to in the Chiarella dissent.
2. The Misappropriation Theory Reverts Back to Parity of Access
“Conditioning liability on the existence of a fiduciary relationship
le[ft] many unexplained gaps in insider trading enforcement [and]
ma[de] what remains of the enforcement scheme unpredictable and
possibly inconsistent . . . .”203  The First Circuit’s holding that disclo-
sure would not vitiate liability for trading on inside information under
Rule 10b-5 moves misappropriation jurisprudence away from the fidu-
ciary duty relationship test and back to a theory that fills these gaps
and provides for more consistent application of the insider trading
provisions, i.e., the parity-of-access theory.204
While the correlation between the misappropriation theory and
the type of duty generally required before liability can attach has
evolved,205 O’Hagan’s adoption of a version of the dissent’s misappro-
203. Painter et al., supra note 16, at 228; see also Theodore C. McCullough, Note, United R
States v. O’Hagan: Defining the Limits of Fraud and Deceptive Pretext Under Rule 10b-5, 22 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 311, 327 (1998) (arguing that the traditional focus on a fiduciary duty
requirement fails to address the pervasiveness of insider trading as well as the ways in which
nonfiduciaries can obtain inside information).
204. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 690 n.6 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“As far as the market is concerned, a trade based on confiden-
tial information is no more ‘honest’ because some third party may know of it so long as
those on the other side of the trade remain in the dark.”).
205. Smith, The Critical Resource Theory, supra note 165, at 1420 (“The most baffling inter- R
section between fiduciary theory and insider trading law arises under the ‘misappropria-
tion’ theory of insider trading.”).  Indeed, “[t]he [misappropriation] theory has spawned
an extraordinary body of cases as well as an even more extraordinary body of hypotheticals
appearing in briefs, treatises, and law review articles exploring the extent and nature of the
fiduciary relationship necessary to make a corporate outsider guilty of insider trading.”
Painter et al., supra note 16, at 156.  Furthermore, “each court interpreting the theory has R
envisioned a target of different size and shape, making the misappropriation theory intol-
erably vague.” Id. at 188; see Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule, Selec-
tive Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,729, 51,738 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(attempting to alleviate the problem of inconsistent case law by defining the circumstances
under which a duty of trust or confidence exists); Securities and Exchange Commission,
Proposed Rule, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (pro-
posed Dec. 28, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1065-2) (proposing a three-part test for
determining whether a duty of trust or confidence exists); Jonn R. Beeson, Comment,
Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the Misappropriation Theory, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1141–47 (1996) (discussing the problems with application of the mis-
appropriation theory and advocating a regulatory solution); Grzebielski, supra note 187, at R
467–68 (“[T]he scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s . . . prohibition
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priation theory from Chiarella gave some credence to those dissenting
Justices’ arguments that any time a purchaser or seller of securities
gains information via an illegal act, the trader has a duty to disclose or
abstain, regardless of the existence of a fiduciary duty.206  The essence
of this position is the parity-of-access to information theory of liability
for insider trading207 that “all investors should have equal access to
information that a reasonable investor would consider material to in-
vestment decisions, and that any trade in which only one party had an
opportunity to learn and did learn such information is inherently un-
fair.”208  This doctrine derives from the “integrity of the market the-
ory, which states [that] investors will be more confident and more
likely to participate in the market if they feel confident they can trade
without being at an informational disadvantage.”209  As one commen-
tator suggested:
The rules have changed since the Supreme Court rejected
the parity-of-[access to] information doctrine in Chiarella and
Dirks.  If the Securities Exchange Act’s true objective is “to
insure honest securities markets and thereby promote inves-
tor confidence” as Justice Ginsberg stated in O’Hagan, the
courts should replace the fiduciary duty requirement in the
fraud-on-the-source approach to the misappropriation the-
ory with the parity-of-[access to] information doctrine and a
fraud-on-the-market approach.210
The First Circuit effectively did this in Rocklage, returning the mis-
appropriation theory to its judicial roots in the Chiarella dissent.  In-
deed, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan, the Fourth
Circuit criticized the misappropriation theory being employed by
other circuits, such as the Second and Seventh Circuits, forming the
basis for the Supreme Court’s more modest version of the misappro-
against trading in securities with material, nonpublic information under Rule 10b-5, re-
mained unsettled.”) (citation omitted); see also 2 BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPO-
RATIONS: GOVERNANCE & REGULATION § 13:41 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing Rule 10b5-2).
206. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246–47 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 240–41 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that, to serve the policies underlying
the rule, there should be a duty to disclose illegally obtained information).
207. See SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 6–12 (1st Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that courts
may impose liability when information is deceptively acquired).
208. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see also
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (noting the possibility of a broad rule that imposes liability on
anyone who participates in transactions “based on material, nonpublic information”).
209. Smith, supra note 3, at 1026–27 (citing Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal R
Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115 (1985)).
210. Id. at 1028 (citing Rule 10b5-2 as support for this argument) (citation omitted).
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priation theory expressed in O’Hagan,211 on the ground that the re-
quirement for a breach of a fiduciary duty was illusory.  As such, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that the misappropriation theory would ul-
timately have to become some form of a parity-of-access theory for it
to remain intellectually viable.212
Justice Blackmun recognized this point twenty-seven years ago in
his Chiarella dissent.  In Chiarella, he wrote that liability should attach
whenever an illegal act yields access to confidential information, and
the recipient does not abstain from trading or disclose to the source
of the information, regardless of the existence of a fiduciary duty.213
Blackmun would always hold mere thieves liable under Rule 10b-5 for
insider trading.214
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Cherif, employing a modest variety
of the misappropriation theory,215 recognized the possibility of even
that version applying to mere thieves:216
There has been some suggestion that Rule 10b-5 should ap-
ply even to “mere” thieves.  See Chiarella, (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting that any time information is acquired by
an illegal act, whether in breach of a fiduciary duty or not,
there is a duty to disclose that information to the purchaser
or seller with whom the acquirer trades); Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, (suggesting that trading on “misap-
propriate[d] or illegally obtain[ed]” information constitutes
211. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 & n.3 (1997).
212. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the Supreme Court’s interpretations of that language, and the purposes of those provisions
did not support the adoption of the misappropriation theory.  United States v. Bryan, 58
F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).  In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit noted:
[W]hile the courts adopting the misappropriation theory incant that the breach
of a fiduciary relationship is a necessary element of the offense, in principle, if
not in reality, these courts would be obliged to find liability in the case of simple
theft by an employee, even where no fiduciary duty has been breached, for the
raison d’etre of the misappropriation theory in fact is concern over “the unfairness
inherent in trading on [stolen] information.”
Id. at 944 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
213. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246–47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410–12 (7th Cir. 1991).
216. While the foregoing analysis brings mere thieves under the purview of insider trad-
ing liability via the courts’ expansion of the misappropriation theory, mere thieves can,
perhaps, also be subject to insider trading liability even under the old model of the misap-
propriation theory—as mere thieves can be viewed as having a fiduciary-like relationship
with the owner of the stolen information. Id. at 412 n.6; LANGEVOORT, supra note 122, R
§ 6.14, at n.5.  The thief could be viewed as holding the misappropriated information in a
constructive trust for the benefit of the owner from which he stole the information.  Id.
(citing Cox v. Schnerr, 156 P. 509, 513 (Cal. 1916); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 & cmt. b
(1939)).
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fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5).  We need not reach this
question because of our holding that Cherif breached a fidu-
ciary duty owed to First Chicago.217
Accordingly, given courts’ expansion of the misappropriation
theory from a narrow version in O’Hagan to the endorsement of the
broader liability in Rule 10b5-2, Rocklage’s removal of the fiduciary re-
quirement, and the reinvigoration of the version of the misappropria-
tion theory originally outlined in the Chiarella dissent, one is left with
the inescapable conclusion that mere thieves are liable for insider
trading under Rule 10b-5.218
217. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412 n.6 (citations omitted).
218. The risk of this application of the parity-of-information theory, applying liability for
trading based upon improperly obtained confidential information, could open analysts up
to liability because of their desire to use their superior knowledge of the market to seek out
and put to use information the public does not already know.  The Supreme Court so
intimated in Dirks v. SEC:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives
material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.  It is commonplace for
analysts to “ferret out and analyze information,” and this often is done by meeting
with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders.  And infor-
mation that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation’s securities.  The analyst’s judgment in this respect
is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm.  It is the
nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that
such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corpora-
tion’s stockholders or the public generally.
463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).  But, this concern is
misplaced, because the theory of liability implicit in this concern is not the parity-of-access
to information theory, but the parity-of-information theory.  The parity-of-information the-
ory, unlike the parity-of-access to information theory, requires all market participants to
have the same information, rather than just the ability to have the same information.  See
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that an obligation to dis-
close arises when an informational advantage is gained by unlawful means).  Of course, the
parity-of-information theory, while intuitively appealing, is, upon any reflection, untena-
ble—it would require those who invest resources and ability to better understand the mar-
ket to share that legally obtained knowledge with all market participants before trading on
that information.  Such a model of behavior is wholly inconsistent with a capitalist econ-
omy because it undermines any incentive (i.e., reward) for effort.  “[T]he value to the
entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signif-
icantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the
analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of all investors.”  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17.
Some have said that attempting to limit market analysts’ use of insider information
while still allowing them to make their recommendations is akin to participating in “a
fencing match conducted on a tightrope.” LANGEVOORT, supra note 122, § 11.2 (quotation R
omitted).  For more information on the Court’s favorable view of analysts’ use of insider
information in Chiarella and Dirks, see Wei Zhang, Wall Street Analysts: A Conflicted Role in the
Marketplace, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 573, 587 (2007). See also Barry, supra note 41, at R
1387–90 (discussing a purpose test for outsider trading and the role of broker advisors).
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IV. LEGISLATION
Some may argue that a judicial application of Rule 10b-5 to mere
thieves exceeds the role of the courts.  In fact, some already propound
that the judicial creation and expansion of the misappropriation the-
ory impermissibly enlarges the language and purpose of the Securities
and Exchange Act in the first place.219
Rather than allowing courts to be criticized for legislating from
the bench, the SEC could revise its own 10b-5 regulations.  The SEC
could accomplish this in three ways: First, the SEC could promulgate
another rule that specifically covers insider trading liability as it relates
to illegally obtained information, as it did in promulgating Rule 14e-
3220 after Chiarella.221  Second, the SEC could specify the parameters
See generally J. Scott Colesanti, Bouncing the Tightrope: The S.E.C. Attacks Selective Disclosure, But
Provides Little Stability for Analysis, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (describing judicial and
legislative efforts in the 1990s to relieve market analysts from the burden of Rule 10b-5).
219. Professor J. Dormer Stephen III elucidates this position:
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a judge realizes
that in the case before him his strongly held view of justice, his political and
moral imperative, is not embodied in a statute or in any provision of the Constitu-
tion.  He must then choose between his version of justice and abiding by the
American form of government.  Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems
to him obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitutional process is ab-
stract, rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels unsatisfying.  To give in to temp-
tation, this one time, solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears
in the American foundation.  A judge has begun to rule where a legislator should.
Stephen, supra note 18, at 326 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE R
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 1 (1990)).  Professor Saikrishna Prakash provided an-
other description:
Indeed, the SEC’s dysfunctional regulatory strategy brings to mind unpleasant
images of Cinderella’s stepsisters who each chopped off portions of a foot in or-
der to stuff the foot into Cinderella’s shoe.  By force, dogged persistence, and
mangling, the shoe can be made to fit in rough measure, but it is hardly a pretty
sight.
Prakash, supra note 121, at 1498.  One commentator even went so far as to present the R
issue as an all-or-nothing ultimatum—either absolute liability applies or no misappropria-
tion theory applies.  Willis W. Hagan II, Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5: The Theoretical
Bases for Liability, 44 BUS. LAW. 13, 33 (1988).
220. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2005):
Transactions in securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information in
the context of tender offers.
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has com-
menced, a tender offer (the “offering person”), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of
the Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating
to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is non-
public and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
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of the prohibition and better define the wrongdoing so as to relieve
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on be-
half of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be pur-
chased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or
exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose
of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press
release or otherwise.
(b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of this
section if such person shows that:
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of such person to
purchase or sell any security described in paragraph (a) of this section or to cause
any such security to be purchased or sold by or on behalf of others did not know
the material, nonpublic information; and
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and proce-
dures, reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature
of the person’s business, to ensure that individual(s) making investment deci-
sion(s) would not violate paragraph (a) of this section, which policies and proce-
dures may include, but are not limited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase,
sale and causing any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those which
prevent such individual(s) from knowing such information.
. . . .
(d)(1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or ma-
nipulative acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, it shall
be unlawful for any person described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section to com-
municate material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other
person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such com-
munication is likely to result in a violation of this section except that this paragraph
shall not apply to a communication made in good faith,
(i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offering person, to its
advisors or to other persons, involved in the planning, financing, preparation or
execution of such tender offer;
(ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be sought by such tender offer,
to its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors or to other persons, in-
volved in the planning, financing, preparation or execution of the activities of the
issuer with respect to such tender offer; or
(iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder.
(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d)(1) of this section are:
(i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors;
(ii) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer or its
officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors;
(iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section
or the issuer or persons in paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section; and
(iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to a tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he
knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of
the above.
221. See Lawrence A. Rosenbloom, Note, Is It Inside or Out?—A Proposal to Clarify the Mis-
appropriation Theory of Unlawful Trading, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 867, 902 & n.231 (1996) (sug-
gesting that the SEC promulgate a prophylactic prohibition against “trading on
misappropriated information that causes a direct and imminent harm to the marketplace,”
similar to Rule 14e-3).
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the courts from the burden of making case-by-case determinations.222
Third, the SEC could establish a general parity-of-access rule and
carve out exceptions as necessary.223
These options will all fail, of course, if courts find that they fall
outside the scope of the SEC’s enabling legislation.  Thus, while SEC
rule-making would increase the ability and the likelihood that courts
will explicitly adopt insider trading liability for mere thieves, this reso-
lution will remain unsatisfying to those concerned about the broad
role that the judiciary has taken in establishing and defining insider
trading liability.224
Alternatively, Congress could amend Section 10(b).225  Moreover,
given Section 10(b)’s ambiguity and unpredictability—and the result-
ing circuit splits—as the judiciary traversed the tortuous path of inter-
preting insider trading regulations, legislative action could set more
definite contours of the Rule’s liability.226
Notwithstanding that the judiciary has essentially created the law
for Rule 10b-5—or perhaps because of it—no single definition of in-
sider trading exists.227  In 1987, some members of Congress, possibly
222. See Painter et al., supra note 16, at 218–20 (emphasizing the need for the SEC to R
define the boundaries of insider trading, and recommending that Congress enact a defini-
tion if the SEC fails to do so).
223. See id. at 221 (“For instance, Congress could establish a pre-United States v. Chiarella
equality of access approach, even for outsiders, and then carve out exceptions, if necessary,
for securities analysts and perhaps others who are perceived to benefit securities markets
through their use of nonpublic information.”).
224. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. R
225. See supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text. R
226. One United States Senator seeking to enact new insider trading legislation empha-
sized this point:
[T]he present state of uncertainty about [insider trading] law is simply not ac-
ceptable.  The ambiguities about the law were vividly demonstrated in subcommit-
tee hearings earlier where members of the securities industry and securities bar
could not specify what conduct constituted insider trading and what conduct is
permissible.  I believe that an “I know it when I see it standard” is totally
unacceptable.
Painter et al., supra note 16, at 202 (citing 133 CONG. REC. 16,393 (1987) (statement of Sen. R
D’Amato)).  Justice Rehnquist has stated that Rule 10b-5 is a “judicial oak” that grew from
a “legislative acorn.”  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
227. Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary offers the following illustration of the difficulty in
defining “insider trading” under the law:
“What is insider trading?”  The term is probably best defined, to the extent any
definition is adequate, as “the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of mate-
rial, non-public information.”  What counts as “non-public information”?  What
non-public information can be deemed “material”?  When is a trader who is in
possession of material, non-public information trading “on the basis of” that in-
formation?  Must the information be about the company whose securities are be-
ing purchased or sold?  What characteristics establish “insider” status sufficient to
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seeking to reverse the judiciary’s encroachment on the legislature’s
traditional function, attempted to codify a definition of insider trad-
ing as part of the Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987.  The act
stated that “information shall have been used or obtained wrongfully
only if it has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or
indirectly, theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fidu-
ciary, contractual, employment, personal, or other relationship of
trust and confidence.”228  This definition would encompass the activi-
ties of mere thieves.
The SEC, however, fearing that this definition might constrain its
enforcement abilities, objected and instead proposed the following
even broader definition:229
Trading while in possession of material, non-public informa-
tion is wrongful only if such information has been obtained
by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A)
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through elec-
tronic or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation
or any other breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any per-
sonal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or
breach of any contractual or employment relationship.230
Of course, the SEC’s definition would have also imposed liability
on mere thieves.  However, no congressional consensus developed on
a definition and certain members of Congress worried about the unin-
tended effects of such a codification.231  Accordingly, Congress did
warrant legal proscriptions of trading?  These are all questions that are derived
from the definition of insider trading just offered . . . .
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 811 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting EDWARD FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 3 (1991)).  One commentator has suggested that the lack of a
clear legislative definition of insider trading gives offenders justification to disclaim respon-
sibility by denying awareness that their conduct was criminal. See SZOCKYJ, supra note 16, at R
108–11.
228. Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 100. R
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. (noting that Congress delayed codifying a definition of insider trading be-
cause of controversy surrounding proposed language).  Such laws potentially affect wealthy
campaign contributors, and are perhaps subject to more legislative reticence as a conse-
quence. See Bernie DeGroat, Corporate Political Donations Make Millions for Shareholders, THE
UNIVERSITY RECORD ONLINE (Univ. of Michigan), Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.umich.edu/
~urecord/0607/Jan22_07/12.shtml (providing data on corporate contributions to political
campaigns and suggesting that such contributions affect the legislation process).  Publicly
traded firms contribute, on average, nearly $65,000 to 56 Congressional candidates over
every two-year election cycle, comprising roughly eleven percent of total campaign financ-
ing, and Huseyin Gulen, Professor of Finance at Virginia Tech University, commented that
“[r]emarkably, there is a positive and significant relationship between contributions [made
by publicly traded companies] and future profitability [of those companies].” Id.
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not include any definition whatsoever in the statute.232  No definition
has been codified since.233  Instead, Congress has—essentially
through institutional paralysis—effectively acceded to the judiciary’s
development of this area of the law.234
Almost every other country that prohibits insider trading uses
statutes that specifically define the relevant terms.  Moreover, “[t]he
European Union revised their insider trading laws to make it clear
that any gaining of inside information by criminal activity would be a
violation of insider trading laws.”235  Only the United States refuses to
legislatively define its terms, allowing the judiciary significant discre-
tion in developing the prohibition against insider trading.236  While
232. Steve Thel, Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act: Congress, the Supreme Court, the
SEC, and the Process of Defining Insider Trading, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1991); see also
H.R. REP NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), cited in CHARLES O’KELLEY & ROBERT THOMPSON, COR-
PORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 1037 (4th ed. 2003).  The report states:
While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines for behavior
which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee neverthe-
less declined to include a statutory definition in this bill for several reasons.  First,
the Committee believed that the court-drawn parameters of insider trading have
established clear guidelines for the vast majority of traditional insider trading
cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be narrowing, and in an
unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law.  Second, the Committee
did not believe that the lack of consensus over the proper delineation of an in-
sider trading definition should impede progress on the needed enforcement re-
forms encompassed within this legislation.  Accordingly, the Committee does not
intend to alter the substantive law with respect to insider trading with this legisla-
tion.  The legal principles governing insider trading cases are well-established and
widely-known.
Id.
233. Some suggest that this outcome is a positive result: “Like a gardener caring for a
rose bush, the courts have allowed the definition of insider trading to blossom, often prun-
ing it back when it becomes overgrown, continually reshaping it.”  SZOCKYJ, supra note 16, R
at 54. But see Painter et al., supra note 16, at 228 (stating that if the government recognizes R
that all of this confusion “stems from the way courts have interpreted a statutory provision
that does not even mention, much less define, insider trading or misappropriation,” then
the government should recognize the need to amend the law governing insider trading).
234. See H.R. REP NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), cited in O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note
232, at 1037 (stating that Congress has declined to codify a definition for insider trading R
because members believed court-drawn parameters were sufficient).
235. Floyd Norris, Is Theft Deception? It Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C1 (quoting
Georgetown Law Professor, and expert on insider trading, Donald Langevoort).
236. See Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading Regulation—A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT’L
LAW. 153, 162–63 (2003).  Steinberg comments on the discrepancy as follows:
Unlike the United States, key terms comprising the insider trading offense are
delineated by statute.  For example, . . . [u]nder German law, an “insider fact” is
“knowledge of a fact not publicly known relating to one or more issuers of insider
securities or to insider securities and which fact is capable of substantially influ-
encing the price of the insider securities in the event of it becoming publicly
known.”  Other nations likewise define, pursuant to statute, the elements of privi-
leged information or an inside fact.  Additional key concepts are also set forth by
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legislation would guarantee the application of Rule 10b-5 to mere
thieves,237 future legislative action seems unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
Securities markets face a new threat never before seen.  Now for
the first time thieves can use relatively unsophisticated technology to
conduct corporate espionage and, thereafter, trade stock based on
their stolen secrets.  Indeed, the SEC’s recent confrontation with this
phenomenon only foreshadows its likely greater incidence in the near
future.  Unfortunately, the largely court-created securities jurispru-
dence has failed to address the scope of liability for this growing prob-
lem due to its novelty.238
In this Article, I set forth a jurisprudential analysis under which
mere thieves who trade on stolen confidential information are liable
under Rule 10b-5 pursuant to insider trading doctrine.239  This theory
is significant for two reasons.  The first is purely practical: insider trad-
ing liability offers much greater damages than 10b-5 liability for sim-
ple fraud.240  The second is philosophical: the theory laid out in this
Article is not only supported by case law, it is sound policy.  Full appli-
cation of Rule 10b-5 to mere thieves would properly order penalties
for wrongdoers.  The foundational premise of the theory is that the
misconduct committed by thieves is more culpable than misconduct
committed by traditional insiders, because insiders obtain their infor-
mation lawfully but use it unlawfully, whereas the thief obtains his in-
statute, including, for example, those persons who are defined as insiders, en-
joying a “special relationship” with the enterprise or having “access” to nonpublic
information.
Id.; see also Painter et al., supra note 16, at 211–12 (observing that the United States is R
unique in prohibiting insider trading using a common law approach).  The lack of a spe-
cific definition has clearly led to confusion in the general public, so much so that some see
the seriousness of insider trading as “loosely analogous to jaywalking.” SZOCKYJ, supra note
16, at 110–11. R
237. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that the statutory language of Section 10(b) “must
be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transac-
tion”); Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 108 (criticizing Rule 10b-5 as being “im- R
permissibly vague for a criminal statute” and suggesting that the rule should be limited so
that it applies to mere thieves); Painter et al., supra note 16, at 196–200 (describing the R
limitations of the Court’s role in defining criminal conduct and the resulting ambiguities
concerning the scope of culpability for insider trading); see also SZOCKYJ, supra note 16, at R
108 (suggesting that the lack of a legislative definition of insider trading hampers the pros-
ecution of insiders).
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. See supra Part III.
240. See supra Part II.A.–B.
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formation unlawfully and uses it unlawfully.  The thief’s wrongdoing is
at least as significant as the insider’s, if not more so, thus, thief’s pun-
ishment should reflect this culpability.
